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riddle”); and (2) if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the
conventional view explains, why do minority shareholders still invest their
money in controlled corporations? (the “flipside of Gilson’s riddle”). In
order to answer these conundrums, Professor Gilson himself proposes a
potential—but partial—solution namely the product market-based account
(PMBA). Against this backdrop, I begin with a critical review of the
PMBA. Then, I propose alternative solutions to the PMBA for corporate
governance conundrums. As for Gilson’s riddle, I analyze how a
controlling shareholder can gain both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits
by having more minority shareholders through equity financing (despite
deep discount on equity securities). As for the flipside of Gilson’s riddle, I
explain why minority shareholders tolerate a controlling shareholder’s
expropriation, and how they can gain benefits through capital market
transactions that can compensate for insufficient investor protection.
Consequently, I show that both a controlling shareholder and minority
shareholders—as a seller and purchasers in a capital market—accept
market terms and conditions because their interwoven relationship creates
symbiosis and a mutual hostage situation. In such cases, their cooperation
is compelled and strengthened, and economic development ensues. That
relationship explains why some bad-law countries have functional capital
markets—an anomalous result from the standpoint of the conventional
view.
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INTRODUCTION
“Law and finance”1 literature was revolutionized by four distinguished
economists—La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (hereinafter
“LLSV”)—who explained that the legal origin of a country is statistically
correlated with the quality of corporate governance and patterns of share
ownership.2 In particular, LLSV’s series of studies3 show that controlling
1. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (examining the origin
of legal rules in forty nine countries and determining how the legal origin of those rules
relates to share ownership).
2. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal
Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2120 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE, 285 (2008) (providing
a summary of research showing the correlation between legal origin and economic
outcomes, determining implications of this research, and attempting to rebut objections to
this research); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert
Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000) (arguing
that the legal approach provides a better understanding of corporate governance than the

KANG_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

846

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

6/3/14 10:18 AM

[Vol. 16:3

shareholder regimes—economies that are dominated by controlling
shareholders—exist in those jurisdictions where minority shareholders are
not protected from controlling shareholders’ expropriation of corporate
assets. 4 This view opens a new and insightful paradigm to analyze
international corporate governance.
On the other hand, LLSV’s studies have been criticized because their
conclusions and methodologies are misleading in some respects. 5 In
addition, many puzzles remain unsolved by law and finance accounts. In
particular, in his Stanford Law Review article,6 Professor Ronald Gilson
raises a critical point that neither LLSV nor the law and finance literature
explain: if laws are too poor to protect public investors in “bad-law
countries”7 as LLSV explain, then why do public investors continue to
participate in such unfair capital markets?8 A potential answer to this
question is that public investors in a country with poor investor protection
would severely discount the price of shares in response to controlling
shareholders’ expropriation. Accordingly, corporations could potentially
receive less proceeds from public investors in a stock market than the
difference between market-centered and bank-centered financial systems); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (showing that economies with poorer protection
for investors have smaller capital markets); La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1
(explaining the correlation between share ownership and the origin of legal rules in many
countries).
4. Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2006); Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the
World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).
5. Professor Coffee points out that correlation between strength of capital markets and
legal protection for public investors does not mean causation. John C. Coffee Jr., Do Norms
Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2154 (2000). Criticizing
LLSV’s direction of causation, Professor Milhaupt suggests that economic structures may
determine law, which is exactly opposite of the law and finance theory. Milhaupt, supra
note 2, at 2122-23. Professor Gilson claims that LLSV depend on a simplified syllogism
that is insufficient to explain the entire controlling shareholder regimes. Ronald J. Gilson,
Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries:
Anchoring Relational
Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (2007) [hereinafter Controlling Family Shareholders
in Developing Countries].
6. Id.
7. The expression of “bad-law countries (or jurisdictions)” has been widely used in
the literature. See Gilson, supra note 4 (describing bad-law countries as those with
“inefficient controlling shareholder systems”); Gilson, supra note 5 (using “developing
countries” and “emerging market countries” interchangeably to describe “bad-law
countries”).
8. See Gilson, supra note 5, at 634. This question is referred to as the “flipside of
Gilson’s riddle.” On the other hand, for an explanation of “Gilson’s riddle,” see infra notes
9-11. See also infra note 30 (explaining how Gilson’s riddle and the flipside of Gilson’s
riddle are related).
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intrinsic value of stocks issued. In other words, as Professor Gilson
expresses, equity financing might be too expensive to a corporation in a
bad-law country.9 Then, a closely related puzzle in a bad-law economy
(hereinafter, “Gilson’s riddle”10) is “why do companies choose to pay the
very high price for equity given the bad shareholder protection discount
and the availability of cheaper alternatives[?]” 11 Or, from another
perspective, why don’t controlling shareholders expropriate more in order
to compensate for the expensive equity financing? And why do some of
them voluntarily set the limit of “tunneling” 12 —namely, a controlling
shareholder’s expropriation from minority shareholders—even though total
expropriation is not efficiently regulated by the poor legal system in a badlaw jurisdiction?13
To solve this series of closely related conundrums in bad-law
countries, Professor Gilson proposes an insightful hypothesis: the product
market-based account (PMBA).14 According to the PMBA, a corporation
treats its minority shareholders fairly because such fair treatment could
serve as a signal of credibility and trustworthiness to trading partners in a
product market.15 In this sense, the corporation’s reputational benefits in a
product market may justify the additional cost of equity in a capital
market.16 Put differently, even though having a large number of minority
shareholders is costly due to expensive equity financing, it is ultimately
beneficial to a controlling shareholder because minority shareholders
function as proverbial canaries in the coal mine proving the controlling
shareholders’ integrity.17 In this way, some argue that Gilson’s riddle—i.e.,
the puzzle as to why a controlling shareholder relies on expensive equity
financing (and consequently has many minority shareholders from a public
capital market)—is solved.

9. Gilson, supra note 5, at 647.
10. “Gilson’s riddle” was coined by Professor Fox. Discussion with Merritt Fox,
Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y.
11. See Gilson, supra note 5, at 647 (explaining why equity capital is an unattractive
option in jurisdictions with poor shareholder protection) (emphasis added).
12. See generally Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes &
Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000) (defining “tunneling” and
attempting to answer many questions about tunneling and its effects on the legal treatment
of minority shareholders). Tunneling refers to the “transfer of assets and profits out of firms
for the benefit of those who control them,” occurred especially frequently throughout the
“emerging markets crisis of 1997-1998.” Id. at 22.
13. See generally Gilson, supra note 5, at 646-51.
14. See id. (discussing product market influences and the role of minority
shareholders); infra Part I.C (analyzing controlling shareholder regimes and the PMBA).
15. See Gilson, supra note 5, at 646-51.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 648.
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The purpose of this Article is to offer, through a theoretical approach
(rather than via case study), potential answers to the corporate governance
puzzles raised by Professor Gilson, which still remained uncharted. Most
of all, this Article reviews the PMBA,18 and then challenges its general
application in controlling shareholder regimes.19 In particular, the PMBA’s
implicit premise—that a controlling shareholder is concerned about a
corporation’s additional cost in equity finance—is criticized.20 Instead, I
argue that the controlling shareholder’s personal cost is the core
determinant of his decision. In this sense, the PMBA’s premise does not
hold well under the “controlling minority structure” (CMS) 21 where a
controlling shareholder owns only a small fraction of the economic interest
of a corporation (e.g., 5%). In a CMS case which is not uncommon
throughout the world, a controlling shareholder would not consider a
corporation’s costs very seriously, as opposed to the theoretical foundation
of the PMBA.22
In addition to criticisms of the PMBA, this Article proposes new
answers to Gilson’s riddle—why a controlling shareholder in a bad-law
country needs external equity capital even if newly issued stocks are costly
to him.23 First, the additional cost of equity finance is not out-of-pocket
cost but opportunity cost so that a controlling shareholder has tendency to
be less concerned about it. Second, a controlling shareholder is able to take
more private benefits if he has more public shareholders investing in new
equities issued by his controlled corporation. Put differently, even if a
controlling shareholder illicitly takes a small amount from each noncontrolling shareholder, the sum of extractions from a large number of noncontrolling shareholders would be huge. Third, building a large business
empire may bring a controlling shareholder more psychological utility (or
non-pecuniary benefits24 such as leadership, fame, and social influence)25 as

18. See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing Gilson’s riddle and the PMBA).
19. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing a critical review of the PMBA).
20. See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing the validity of the PMBA when a controlling
shareholder owns small economic interest in a corporation).
21. Despite his minority ownership, a CMS controlling shareholder can exercise
control over a corporation through various voting leverages. In terms of ownership, a CMS
controller is also a minority shareholder. In this Article, however, “minority shareholders”
are meant to be non-controlling public shareholders. For a more explanation of the CMS,
see generally Bebchuk et al., infra note 39 (discussing the disparity between voting rights
and cash flow rights of a controlling shareholder in the CMS).
22. See infra Part I.C.3. Nonetheless, equity finance is still expensive to a CMS
controlling shareholder, since he is required to spend a fraction of the corporation’s cost
(e.g., 5%) anyway. Part II solves this problem.
23. As for answers to Gilson’s riddle, see infra Part II.
24. For an explanation of psychological benefits, see Gilson, supra note 4, at 1663-64.
25. Most of the extant literature on corporate governance has focused on a controlling
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well as handsome economic benefits. As for the question of a controlling
shareholder’s voluntary limit of expropriation,26 it can be explained that if a
controlling family shareholder rationally pursues a long-term goal of
maximizing his private benefits, then he ought to be generous and attract
more minority shareholders.27
As Alfred Marshall famously said, supply and demand “curves are
like scissor blades that intersect at equilibrium.” 28 Analysis from the
standpoint of a controlling shareholder would be insufficient because
transactions in a stock market would not take place unless non-controlling
shareholders purchased shares from a controlled corporation. In other
words, both the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders embrace
one another by accepting market terms and conditions. Then another
corporate governance puzzle (hereinafter, the “flipside of Gilson’s
riddle”)29 can arise: “why do minority shareholders purchase any shares at
all in the absence of an observable ceiling on private benefit extraction?”30
To answer this question, this Article presents a series of unconventional

shareholder’s pecuniary private benefits (i.e., extraction from minority shareholders such as
self-dealing). However, a controlling shareholder seeks to gain non-pecuniary private
benefits from running a corporation as well. Then, a model assuming that a controlling
shareholder maximizes his pecuniary benefits is not precise, even though it explains very
important features of a controlling shareholder regime. A more precise model is based on
the notion that a controlling shareholder maximizes his utility arising from non-pecuniary
benefits as well as pecuniary benefits. Put differently, a controlling shareholder’s utility
function (“U”) can be expressed as [U = U (pecuniary benefits, non-pecuniary benefits)].
26. This question is related to the question mentioned in supra note 8’s accompanying
text.
27. As for an analysis of a controlling shareholder’s rationally mild tunneling, see
generally Sang Yop Kang, “Generous Thieves”: The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholder
Arrangements in Bad-Law Jurisdictions, DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2014) (explaining
that a self-interested controlling shareholder may impose a lenient level of expropriation
from minority shareholders since the total pecuniary benefits from repeated and mild
expropriations would be greater than pecuniary benefits from one-shot and severe
expropriation).
28. The Concise Library of Economics: Alfred Marshall, ECONLIB (2008), available
at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Marshall.html.
29. While Gilson’s riddle approaches from the perspective of buyers (i.e., public
investors) in a capital market, the flipside of Gilson’s riddle approaches from the perspective
of sellers (i.e., corporations or controlling shareholders) in a capital market.
30. Gilson, supra note 5, at 647. As for answers to the flipside of Gilson’s riddle, see
infra Part III. Professor Gilson seems to explain that Gilson’s riddle and the flipside of
Gilson’s riddle are inherently related (“Cost considerations make equity capital an even less
attractive source of financing in these jurisdictions than in those with good shareholder
protection. Indeed, it is a two-sided puzzle, with the possibility of a lemons’ market: why
do companies choose to pay the very high price for equity given the bad shareholder
protection discount and the availability of cheaper alternatives, and why do minority
shareholders purchase any shares at all in the absence of an observable ceiling on private
benefit extraction?” Id.).
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explanations: (1) the “stationary controller”31 account; (2) the “limited
opportunities of other investments” account; (3) the minorities’ behavioral
finance account; (4) the “minorities might not be damaged” account; (5) the
foreign minorities account; and (6) the minorities’ free-ride account. Most
well-functioning capital markets in less developed economies are likely to
be subject to at least some of these accounts.
Against this backdrop, this Article proceeds according to the
following structure. Part I sets out the features of controlling shareholder
regimes and explains how information asymmetry, coupled with
insufficient protection of public investors, would potentially destroy a
capital market. Then, the PMBA is introduced and critically reviewed.
Part II proposes alternatives to the PMBA, answering Gilson’s riddle from
the controlling shareholder’s perspective. Subsequently, Part III proposes
possible reasons why minority shareholders are willing to participate in a
seemingly unfair capital market (i.e., the flipside of Gilson’s riddle). The
Article then concludes by summarizing key points.
As the saying goes, “[i]t takes two to tango.”32 A message in this
Article is that when both a controlling shareholder and minority
shareholders realize that their interwoven relationship creates symbiosis
and mutual hostage, their cooperation is often compelled and strengthened.
Then, economic development could ensue even in a bad-law country.
Although the combination of well-written laws and efficient enforcement
mechanisms plays an important role in the development of a capital market,
a functional market still may form and develop without sufficient formal
legal protections for public investors.33
I. CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER REGIMES AND THE PRODUCT MARKETBASED ACCOUNT
Berle and Means’ model34 of dispersed ownership assumes that a large
number of dispersed shareholders collectively own shares of a large-scale

31. For a further discussion of minority shareholders’ response under a stationary
controller, see infra Part III.A.
32. Discussion with Merritt Fox, Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y.
33. However, if the present conditions change in the future, it is possible that the
symbiotic relationship between a controller and non-controlling shareholders would no
longer exist. For example, as the process of globalization continues to gain momentum,
non-controlling shareholders have more opportunities and options to diversify their assets
internationally. As a result, a domestic controlling shareholder’s ability to keep public
investors in his controlled corporation could be diminished. Discussion with Jeffrey
Gordon, Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y.
34. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION &
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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corporation.35 Since there is no dominant shareholder, corporate power
belongs to management. However, this model is limited to the United
States and the United Kingdom.36 In many countries, controlling family
shareholders run conglomerates and business groups. 37 In developing
countries with a controlling shareholder regime, minority shareholders are
poorly protected within formal legal structures, such as corporate and
securities laws and judicial systems.
A. Controlling Shareholder Ownership: The Controlled Structure
and the Controlling Minority Structure
In the controlling shareholder regime, most corporate governance
literature presumes that a large block-holder controls a corporation by
owning a majority of shares.38 For example, when a dominant shareholder
owns 51% of a corporation’s shares, he exercises 51% of the voting rights.
In this way, voting rights and cash flow rights are generally aligned.39 This
type of controlling shareholder ownership is referred to as a “controlled
structure” (CS). 40 However, another significant pattern of controlling
shareholder ownership occurs where a controlling shareholder wields a
significant percentage of voting rights even though he holds a small
percentage of equity. For example, a shareholder who owns 10% of shares
may be able to exercise 51% of votes in a corporation via voting leverage
mechanisms. Since a controlling shareholder is also a minority shareholder
in terms of the quantity of his equity stake, this regime is referred to as the

35. John C. Coffee Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 641 (1999).
36. Id.; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 133 (1999) (explaining how
most public companies in the United States and the United Kingdom have dispersed
ownership, while public companies in the rest of the world generally have controlling
ownership); La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 474 (authors find that “the Berle and Means
corporation is far from universal, and is quite rare for some definitions of control.”).
37. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 481-83.
38. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limit, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 238 (2002)
(discussing how blockholders who have controlling stock attempt to maintain control by
owning 51% or more of stock).
39. For a further explanation of the relationship between a controlling shareholder’s
voting rights and cash flow rights, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, &
George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The
Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, (Nat’l Bureau
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6951, 1999) (also published in CONCENTRATED CORP.
OWNERSHIP
(Randall
K.
Morck
ed.,
2000)),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6951.pdf?new_window=1.
40. Id. at 1.
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“controlling minority structure” (CMS).41 Many Chinese companies use
the CMS where a pyramiding structure is used.42 Similar examples of CMS
are observable in Europe, South America, South Africa, and other Asian
countries.
Korean CMS cases are noteworthy. Controlling family shareholders
of large corporate groups in Korea hold, on average, 5.04% of ownership
stake.43 In fact, 5.04% includes family members’ economic interest as well
as controlling shareholders’ personal economic interest.44 The controlling
shareholders’ average personal economic interest alone is merely 2.62%.45
For example, in Samsung Group (Apple’s global business rival, Samsung
Electronics, is an affiliated firm of the group), Chairman Kun-Hee Lee
holds only 0.69% of the economic interest,46 although he is undoubtedly
“the” group’s controlling shareholder with nearly a majority of voting
rights in the group. More strikingly, the ownership stake that Chairman
Tae-Won Choi personally holds in SK Group47 is only 0.04% (note that
0.04% is not a typo). 48 Nonetheless, he effectively wields controlling
voting power over the entire group.
How can CMS controlling shareholders maintain control with a small
fraction of personal (or family) ownership stake? Professors Bebchuk,
Kraakman and Triantis explain that “[s]uch a radical separation of control

41. Id.; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global
Governance Standards, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1263, 1313 n.161 (2009) (“The term ‘controlling
minority’ was introduced by Bebchuk et al. . . . .”).
42. For a general explanation of China’s corporate pyramiding structure, see Joseph
P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in China,
CHINESE UNIV. HONG KONG (May 2005), http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/pengxu/project/asia/pdf/fan_wong_zhang.pdf.
43. See Press Release, Kor. Exch., Changing Status of Largest Shareholders’
Ownership of Stock in Ten Conglomerates of S. Kor. (June 23, 2011) (data was collected as
of
2011),
available
at http://www.krx.co.kr/m10/m10_1/m10_1_3/JHPKOR10001_03_01.jsp?sch=all&noti_no
=20249&cur_page=1&rn=6536&word.
44. As of April 2011, among ten of the largest corporate groups in Korea, while
controlling shareholders individually held 2.42% of economic interest of corporate groups,
their families hold 2.62% (thus, the total ownership is 5.04 %). Id.
45. Id.
46. Jong-Sun Yun, Kun-Hee Lee 0.69%, Tae-Won Choi 0.04% ‘Dominate Whole
Enterprise’ by Holding Minimal Economic Interests, E-DAILY NEWS (May 30,
2013), http://www.edaily.co.kr/news/NewsRead.edy?SCD=JA11&newsid=0197456660281
4168&DCD=A00101&OutLnkChk=Y. Including his family’s cash flow rights, Mr. Lee
holds 1.27% of economic interest in Samsung Group. Id.
47. See Global 500—Our Annual Ranking of the World’s Largest Corporations, CNN
MONEY
(July
23,
2012),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/full_list/index.html (ranking SK
Holdings as sixty-fifth in the world).
48. Yun, supra note 46.
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and cash flow rights can occur in three principal ways: through dual-class
share structures, stock pyramids, and cross-ownership ties.”49
First, in a dual-class share structure, a corporation issues “two or more
classes of stock with differential voting rights.”50 For example, Class A
stock has one-share-one-vote, while Class B stock equates to one-shareten-vote. Some U.S. corporations use such a system. Second, stock
pyramiding “is defined as the ultimate ownership of a firm running through
a chain of ownership of intermediate corporations.”51 In a simple model, an
individual holds 51% of ownership of Company A, which subsequently
owns 51% of Company B. The individual exercises full control over
Company B through the chain of ownership from Company A even though
his economic interest in Company B is merely 26% (i.e., 51% x 51% =
26%). Third, cross ownership is used when a corporation holds an
ownership stake in other affiliated firms. Suppose that there are three
corporations (Company A, B, and C) in a business group: Company A
holds ownership stake of Company B and C; Company B holds ownership
of Company C and A; and Company C holds ownership of Company A and
B. Cross ownership is especially useful in jurisdictions where a dual-class
share structure and stock pyramiding are not allowed. Cross ownership
becomes more complicated as the number of affiliated firms grows within a
business group.52 Via a network effect that runs through the complicated
ownership web among affiliated firms, a CMS controller—such as
Chairman Lee in Samsung and Chairman Choi in SK—can exercise control
with a small fraction of economic interest.
In sum, holding a majority of common shares and economic interest is
not necessary to exercise control. Rather, one’s “control” means a status
with a significant holding of “voting” rights. Indeed, it is often possible
that a shareholder with less than a majority of the voting rights can wield
effective control.53 For example, a shareholder may dominate a corporation
49. Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 1.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, Larry H. P. Lang,
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholders, 57 J. FIN.,
2741, 2743 n.1 (2002). For more explanation on stock pyramiding, see, e.g., Randall Morck
& Bernard Yeung, Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups, 27
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE 367 (2003).
52. If there are “n” affiliated firms in a corporate group, then there are “n x (n – 1)”
ways for intra-shareholding (through cross ownership in a matrix form) to occur among
affiliated firms. For example, if there are 70 affiliated firms (which is not uncommon in
Korean corporate groups), there are 4,830 possible intra-shareholdings among affiliated
firms in a corporate group (70 x 69 = 4,830). If direct cross-shareholding (Company A
owns a part of Company B, and Company B owns a part of Company A) is prohibited, the
number of possible ways of intra-shareholding in a corporate group is “n x (n – 1) / 2”.
53. According to the City Code in the United Kingdom, a person (or a group) has
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with just 40% voting power if the rest of shareholders are dispersed and
cannot form a unified insurgent group against him. For the purpose of
simplicity, however, Table 1 summarizes the two aforementioned patterns
of controlling shareholder systems, assuming that control means holding
more than a majority of the voting rights.
TABLE 1: COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CS AND THE CMS
CS

CMS

A Controlling
Shareholder’s
Cash Flow Rights (“α”)

More than 50%
(0.5 < α ≤ 1)

Less than 50 %
(0 ≤ α < 0.5)

A Controlling
Shareholder’s
Voting Rights

More than 50%

More than 50 %

None (for the Pure CS)

- Stock Pyramiding
- Dual-Class Share
Structure
- Cross-Shareholding

Voting Leverage
Mechanisms

B. Asymmetric Information and the Lemon Market Problem
A well-performing securities market should be built upon disclosed
information54 and efficient regulations. In a bad-law country, however,
investors suffer from insufficient disclosure systems and lack of
transparency, not to mention inefficient legal infrastructure. A securities
market then becomes highly vulnerable to the “lemon” market problem55
due to the asymmetry of information between sellers (i.e., corporations or
corporate insiders) and buyers (i.e., investors). In a corporation where a

control as long as the person (or the group) has more than 30% of voting rights. The
Takeover Code,
TAKEOVER PANEL,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/thecode/download-code (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). See also Sang Yop Kang, Transplanting a
Poison Pill to Controlling Shareholder Regimes—Why It Is So Difficult, 33 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 619, 642 (2013) (explaining that a shareholder can control a corporation without a
majority of voting rights).
54. For more explanation of the mandatory disclosure and its related discussion, see
generally Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) (arguing that the U.S. “should
reject an issuer choice regime and retain the current [federal] mandatory system”).
55. As for lemon market problem, see generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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controlling shareholder may be actively involved in transactions tainted
with conflicts of interest, the controlling shareholder knows that the
fundamental value of the company has been damaged due to tunneling.
Conversely, prospective investors in the securities market do not know
whether the firm is involved in such misconduct and, if so, to what degree.
At best, investors may only have market statistics about the average quality
of issuers’ corporate governance.56
Knowing that corporations are not distinguished in the market based
on the quality of their corporate governance, issuers with good quality (i.e.,
companies not associated with tunneling) have no incentive to issue, and
only issuers with bad quality (i.e., companies associated with an enormous
amount of tunneling) participate in the securities market. 57 Due to
asymmetric information, therefore, an adverse selection problem emerges.58
Unfortunately this is not the end of the story. In turn, because investors
only know the average quality of companies, they uniformly discount the
issuance of securities more deeply based on the statistics.59 Then, even
those relatively well-governed companies would feel pressure to leave the
market because the price determined by the application of the deeper
discount to all issuers is too cheap for them and well below the fair value of
their securities.60 Ultimately, only companies with the worst quality (i.e.,
companies associated with the most egregious forms of expropriation)
remain in the market in the self-enforcing process of Gresham’s law61—the
bad drive out the good, the worse drive out the bad, and the worst drive out
the worse from the market. Accordingly, the adverse selection is
56. See generally id. (discussing the response of market participants under the
asymmetric information).
57. See Bernard Black, The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets,
55 BUS. LAW. 1565, 1567-68 (2000) (explaining that investors discount all corporations’
shares in a market, resulting in punishment for corporations where insiders do not siphon
corporate assets).
58. Adverse selection is a form of market failure.
Adverse selection arises when products of different qualities are sold at a single
price because buyers or sellers are not sufficiently informed to determine the
true quality at the time of purchase. As a result, too much of the low-quality
product and too little of the high-quality product are sold in the marketplace.
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 616 (Pearson Prentice Hall
6th ed. 2004). For a further explanation of adverse selection, see RICHARD A. IPPOLITO,
ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS (Princeton University Press, 2005) at 299-315.
59. See Black, supra note 57, at 1567.
60. See id. at 1568. See also Akerlof, supra note 55, at 489-92 (introducing the lemon
problem in the market for used cars).
61. Gresham’s law says that “bad money tends to drive good money out of circulation.”
Richard Dutu, Ed Nosal & Guillaume Rocheteau, The Tale of Gresham’s Law, Federal
Reserve
Bank
of
Cleveland
(2005),
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2005/1001.pdf.
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reinforced, leading to market failure and the possibility of the securities
market collapsing, in the absence of adequate measures to correct this
vicious circle.62 Consequently, in a country with poor investor protections,
in theory we will not be able to observe a significant number of minority
shareholders and a well-developed securities market.
This undesirable situation in a bad-law securities market would also
be expected under the pecking order theory 63 of corporate finance. 64
According to the theory, given asymmetric information between corporate
insiders and prospective investors, corporations have a routine order of
financing: (1) first, they use internal financing when available; and (2) if
external financing is required, corporations choose debt over equity.65 As
Professor Gilson explains, this phenomenon takes place because the cost of
equity for a corporation is highest among its financing sources. 66
Prospective investors are more reluctant to purchase newly issued shares
since they lack sufficient information about a corporation’s share price.
Under this asymmetric information scheme, prospective investors—if they
decide to purchase new shares—require a discount. Accordingly, a
corporation receives less than the fair amount of proceeds from selling its
new shares to a capital market. Consequently, equity financing is costly to
a corporation, and thus it is unwilling to issue new shares, as long as it is
able to rely on other types of financing. Simply put, equity financing is
known as the last-resort financing.67
The pecking order of finance could have more serious implications in
a bad-law jurisdiction for two reasons: (1) the severe problem of a
controlling shareholder’s expropriation from minority shareholders makes
62. Professors Khanna and Palepu explain that “[i]n extreme cases, the market breaks
down and no transactions occur.” Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, The Right Way to
Restructure Conglomerates in Emerging Markets, 77 HARV. BUS. REV. 125, 130 (1999).
63. For more information on the pecking order theory, see Stewart C. Myers &
Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have
Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984).
64. In addition to the pecking order theory, the trade-off theory is an alternative model
to explain corporations’ finance decisions. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French,
Financing Decisions: Who Issues Stock?, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 549, 549-50 (2005). According
to the trade-off theory, debt financing has trade-off effect—while it has tax benefits, it
increases financial distress. Id.
65. See generally Myers & Majluf, supra note 63; see also RICHARD A. BREALEY,
STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 490-94
(McGraw-Hill 8th ed. 2006). The pecking order theory relies on an assumption that
corporate insiders are not willing to issue new shares at an undervalued price in a stock
market because it will dilute the share price. Id. at 490-92. Although the validity of the
assumption in relation to agency problems is important, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
Further research will be conducted in an independent project.
66. Gilson, supra note 5 at 647.
67. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 65, at 490.
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equity investment by public shareholders riskier; and, (2) since the
jurisdiction has an underdeveloped disclosure system, the information
asymmetry problem becomes exacerbated. Consequently, equity’s status
as the last resort of financing is reinforced, 68 and equity financing is
substantially more costly to a corporation than bank financing in a bad-law
jurisdiction.69
C. The Product Market-Based Account
This Subpart first introduces the product market-based account
(PMBA),70 and then criticizes various aspects of the PMBA. In particular,
this Subpart explains how the PMBA’s explanatory power can be
weakened when a controlling shareholder has only a small economic
interest in a corporation.
1. Gilson’s Riddle and the Product Market-Based Account
In theory, the cost of equity is so much higher for corporations in badlaw countries. Then, as Gilson’s riddle suggests, why in reality are
corporations in those countries willing to raise capital through an equity
market (although the frequency is low) and have a significant number of
public minority shareholders?71 To answer his riddle, Professor Gilson
himself proposes an insightful hypothesis—the PMBA. Gilson’s riddle
presents a conundrum that arises between a controlling shareholder and
public shareholders. Accordingly, it seems natural to explore the puzzle
from the perspective of a capital market where two parties engage in
transactions. With the paradigm-shifting analysis, however, the PMBA
approaches the puzzle from a product market perspective.72
In a product market, a corporation enters into a myriad of transactions
and contractual relations with its trading partners. Bad-law jurisdictions
lack an efficient commercial law system to enforce contractual obligations
in product markets.73 Interestingly, such contracts are, nonetheless, often
honored. Professor Gilson primarily attributes this phenomenon to the role
of reputation in a market since reputation works as a sort of selfenforcement mechanism. 74 If a corporation cheats its trading partners

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Gilson, supra note 5, at 647.
Id.
See generally id. at 646-651 (discussing the PMBA).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 635.
See id. at 635-36.
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“today,” an inefficient legal system is unable to punish the corporation.
However, the corporation will be punished “tomorrow” by market
mechanisms since market participants will refuse to make transactions with
such a dishonest corporation.
Here, Professor Gilson puts forward a brilliant explanation that
logically connects across a product market as well as a capital market.
According to the PMBA, if a controlling shareholder treats minority
shareholders fairly in his controlled corporation, he will be deemed as
trustworthy by trading partners within a product market.75 In this way,
minority shareholders are akin to “reputational canaries” who convey a
signal to trading partners about a controlling shareholder’s integrity.76
One may ask whether such a signal is merely “cheap talk.” When a
controlling shareholder treats minority shareholders fairly, however, it
means that he is required to give up at least some private benefits that he
could have otherwise extracted from the corporation. 77 In this sense,
according to the PMBA, the signal—i.e., fair treatment of minority
shareholders—is costly to a controlling shareholder so that it is credible.78
In addition, the logic suggests that “[i]f the family-controlled corporation
does not cheat in easy ways (given poor shareholder protection) by
exploiting minority shareholders, . . . the controlling family shareholder
also will not cheat its customers.” 79 With a good reputation among
minority shareholders in a capital market, the corporation over which the
truly honest controlling shareholder exercises control would have more
economic opportunities with trading partners in a product market.80
In sum, the PMBA posits, “[t]he [controlling shareholder’s] decision
to have minority shareholders then can be explained not by the need for
capital . . . , but as a way of developing reputation that will be valuable in
the product market . . . .”81 Such reputational advantage from the product
market where a controlling shareholder participates in a repeated game82
may justify the more expensive equity financing in a capital market, thus it
is argued that Gilson’s riddle is solved.

75. Id. at 648.
76. “[M]inority shareholders play the role of reputational canaries, whose value is that
they help credibly convey to potential traders that the corporation is an honest trading
partner.” Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See generally id. at 646-651.
81. Id. at 648.
82. See id.
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2. A Critical Review of the Product Market-Based Account
The PMBA is the first meaningful attempt to solve Gilson’s riddle, yet
it has remained uncharted at large. Indeed, the PMBA is a creative and
path-breaking study because it analyzes the corporate governance puzzle
between a controller and minority shareholders from an analytical
framework in relation to a product market. As with most pioneering
theories, however, the PMBA might not provide clear answers in some
circumstances. First, how a controlling shareholder’s signal is sent from a
capital market—by treating minority shareholders fairly—to a product
market may be too convoluted to be realistic. Sharing this view, Professors
Gordon and Milhaupt have raised questions about the PMBA’s indirect
path of a controlling shareholder’s signaling. Based on Professor Gilson’s
explanation, suppose that the controlling stakeholder’s primary concern is
the reputation of the controlled corporation within a product market. Why
then would he not show his integrity and honesty directly in a product
market rather than treating minority shareholders fairly in a capital market
and subsequently sending off this signal to the product market?83
Second, the role of local newspapers in improving the quality of
corporate governance should be closely interpreted. According to the
PMBA,
[s]uppose that the treatment of minority shareholders is visible to
a company’s potential trading partners at a low cost, perhaps
because such exploitation is covered by the local newspapers.
Fair treatment of minority shareholders then serves as evidence
of the corporation’s integrity, including its commitment to
performing its contractual obligations . . . .84
This implies that local newspapers functions as a low-cost conduit for
sending information from a capital market to a product market. However,
it is noteworthy that jurisdictions at issue in the PMBA are bad-law
countries where we are concerned about the integrity of large corporations
and the efficiency of the legal systems. Therefore, it is difficult to trust the
integrity and efficiency of the local newspapers in those same
jurisdictions.85
83. Discussion with Jeffrey Gordon and Curtis Milhaupt, Professors, Columbia Law
School, in N.Y.C., N.Y.
84. Gilson, supra note 5, at 648 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
85. Professor Gilson seems to admit this point, although he emphasizes the role of the
press as an efficient corporate governance tool. “Luca Enriques has pointed out that the role
of the financial press may be limited to a handful of developed countries where there is a
widespread confidence in the newspapers’ journalistic integrity. Absent that confidence,
they cannot play the contemplated ‘shaming’ role.” Id. at 648 n.37 (citing E-mail from Luca
Enriques, Professor of Law, University of Bologna, and Commissioner, Commissione
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More importantly, it should be noted that the integrity of local
newspapers could be significantly damaged due to the very nature of
corporate groups, a common business organization in many developing
countries. It is not uncommon for a corporate group to consist of more than
a score of affiliated corporations. Then, it is likely that the corporate group
has a media corporation as well, such that the media corporation is directly
under the influence of the group’s controlling shareholder.86 Even if a
corporate group does not have such a corporation, the group has enormous
influence on the media industry via the sale of advertisements to the press.
Therefore, it is commonplace that local newspapers are biased towards
controlling family shareholders. Simply put, the media is generally not a
fourth branch of the government in such countries.
In addition, contrary to the PMBA’s explanation, it might be difficult
for potential trading partners in a product market to effectively notice a
corporation’s treatment of minority shareholders. 87 Even to large
institutional investors, who are experts in interpreting information from
public corporations in a capital market, examining a particular controlling
shareholder’s treatment of investors is costly. Then, by and large trading
partners—experts on a product market—are less able to interpret capital
market information as efficiently as institutional investors. Thus, it would
be difficult for trading partners to recognize these signals at a low cost.
As aforementioned, the PMBA explains if a controlling shareholder
treats minority shareholders fairly, it would be a good signal to a product
market that the controller is not going to cheat his trading partners. 88
However, it is questionable whether trading partners really think of a
corporation’s treatment of other parties including its minority shareholders,
as a primary standard when they transact with the corporation. Rather,
trading partners are often willing to acquiesce to a corporation’s
misconduct as long as the corporation abides by contracts.
For example, although it is widely alleged that Samsung Group has
serious corporate governance problems (and thus the interest of minority
shareholders is arguably damaged),89 Apple—a large trading partner of

Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), to Ronald J. Gilson, Charles J. Meyers
Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School (Nov. 24, 2006) (on file with author)).
86. In other words, many corporate groups have unrelated diversified business
portfolios. Therefore, it is possible that, for example, a corporate group with a semiconductor affiliate company has a newspaper subsidiary as well as a leisure business
subsidiary.
87. Professors Jeffrey Gordon and Curtis Milhaupt have shared a similar idea with me
on this question. Discussion with Jeffrey Gordon and Curtis Milhaupt, Professors,
Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y.
88. Gilson, supra note 5, at 648.
89. For a discussion of the corporate governance problems created by the Samsung
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Samsung Electronics—has purchased important components (e.g., flash
memory chips) from Samsung Electronics for its iPhone.90 To be sure,
Apple has tried to reduce its dependence on Samsung, but this has largely
been due to its hostile relationship with Samsung over intellectual property
issues in many jurisdictions and its strategic efforts to diversify its
suppliers.91 Another example can be found in the relationship between
Apple and Foxconn in China. Foxconn, a major supplier of Apple, is
infamous for allegedly inhumane working conditions.92 Nonetheless, it
initially seemed that Apple had been apathetic to Foxconn’s mistreatment
of its employees. These examples show how a corporation’s treatment of
third parties—including its minority shareholders or lay-workers—do not
always function as a useful indicator of a corporation’s trustworthiness to
trading partners.93
Moreover, the PMBA is not fit for explaining an export-oriented
developing economy—many successful emerging markets fall into this
category—where a corporation has foreign trading partners.94 It might be
difficult for trading partners in a “foreign product” market (Country A) to
be able to effectively observe and examine a corporation’s conduct in a
“domestic capital” market (Country B). One may argue that newspapers in
developed foreign countries report about a controlling shareholder’s
treatment of minority shareholders in a bad-law jurisdiction. If this is the
case, then the problem of local press independence is solved as well.95
Foreign trading partners may be able to receive relevant information
on a controlling shareholder’s integrity from a distinguished and

Group’s controlling family shareholder, see Kang-Il Lee, Kun-Hee Lee, Not Guilty in a
Criminal Court, But Liable in a Civil Court, HANKOOK DAILY (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/society/201208/h2012082216425322000.htm.
90. Apple and Samsung’s Symbiotic Relationship: Slicing an Apple, ECONOMIST (Aug.
10,
2011),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/08/apple-and-samsungssymbiotic-relationship (“Together, [Samsung’s products] account for 26% of the component
cost of an iPhone.”).
91. Jessica E. Lessin, Lorraine Luk & Juro Osawa, Apple Finds It Difficult to Divorce
Samsung,
WALL
S T.
J.
(July
1,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578513882349940500
(“In the past year, Apple executives have expressed concern that their dependence on
Samsung limits Apple’s ability to control its destiny by constricting Apple’s negotiating
power and ability to use different technologies . . . .”).
92. See Ulianne Pepitone, Foxconn Workers Strike over iPhone 5 Demands, Labor
Group
Says,
CNN
Money
(Oct.
7,
2012),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/05/technology/mobile/foxconn-iphone-5-strike/index.html.
93. Compare with the PMBA.
94. Professor Curtis Milhaupt suggested this issue. Discussion with Curtis Milhaupt,
Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y.
95. For a discussion of the local press independence problem, see supra notes 84-86
and accompanying text.
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independent press in a developed country in a more neutral manner.
Perhaps, sophisticated business newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal
or Financial Times delve into the macroeconomic environment and general
characteristics of a particular country. However, it is highly unlikely that
those newspapers would examine “one particular” controlling shareholder’s
treatment of minority shareholders in a particular developing economy.
Even if they did, the probability of these media sources writing a review of
a particular controlling shareholder is so low that it would be rational for
the controller to ignore that possibility. In addition, as seen in the
Samsung-Apple and Foxconn-Apple examples, foreign trading partners—
even if they know a corporation’s misconduct—have little reason to raise
such an issue as long as the corporation treats its trading partners in a
favorable way.96 In sum, a controlling shareholder in an export-oriented
developing country hardly has reasonable grounds to send a costly signal
from a “domestic capital” market to a “foreign product” markets.
Furthermore, the imperfect industrial organizations in many
developing countries weaken the logic of the PMBA as well. The PMBA
implies that a corporation caters to trading partners in a product market.97
When a corporation is located in a relatively competitive market (e.g., the
United States), trading partners face a more favorable situation because
they can use competitive pressure among corporations. 98 However, in
markets where a few large corporations form a (quasi) monopoly in almost
every product market, each large corporation has powerful leverage vis-àvis trading partners. This kind of relationship describes the general
contours of the bad-law jurisdictions covered by the PMBA.
In these jurisdictions, just as corporate law systems are ineffective,
competition law systems are not effective in regulating the misconduct of
large corporations (and controlling shareholders).99 Thus, the prevailing
phenomenon in developing countries is often described as “Strong
Controlling Shareholders, Weak Trading Partners.” 100 Under these
96. Of course, it is possible that in the future Apple could use Samsung Group’s
corporate governance issues for its business strategy purpose.
97. For example, according to the PMBA, a (family-controlled) corporation sends a
costly signal to trading partners in order to show its integrity. See Gilson, supra note 5, at
648-49. In this sense, the PMBA seems to indicate the corporation’s weak position vis-à-vis
its trading partners.
98. In general, it is explained that the U.S. market is more competitive than markets in
the rest of the world.
99. In other words, the correlation between the quality of corporate law and the quality
of competition law is very high.
100. This expression is borrowed from the title of Professor Roe’s book. MARK J. ROE,
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (Princeton University Press 1994). In a bad-law jurisdiction, powerful market
players are generally large family-controlled corporate groups (and their controlling
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circumstances, the controlling shareholder of a large corporation does not
have to send costly signals about fair dealings with minority shareholders
in order to attract trading partners. In other words, it is trading partners
(rather than a controlling shareholder) that should convince the other party
that they are credible, which is exactly opposite of the PMBA’s main
argument.101
3. When Cash Flow Rights and Voting Rights Are Significantly
Detached
Depending on the reinforced pecking order theory102 —the cost of
equity is substantially higher than the cost of debt to a corporation in a badlaw country 103 —the PMBA concludes that a controlling shareholder’s
decision to rely on an equity market is not explained through capital
market-based accounts. Rather, the PMBA hypothesizes that a corporation
sends off the signal of its integrity to trading partners in a product market
(by showing that the corporation treats minority shareholders fairly), even
if that signaling imposes a financial cost on the corporation (i.e., issuing
stocks at a discounted price).104 To a corporation in a developing country,
perhaps the benefit of maintaining good reputation in a product market may
exceed the cost of signaling. 105 In this Subpart, I explore the above
reasoning by paying attention to the following questions: (1) when issuing
stocks at the discounted price, who will ultimately bear the extra financial
costs, and how much?; (2) who makes the ultimate decision on the capital
structure of a corporation, and what matters most to him?
Indeed, if a corporation’s cost of equity is much higher than the cost
of debt, then the corporation has no good capital market justification to
issue new equities. Thus, if a corporation issues new shares to the public, it
may have product market rationales as the PMBA describes.106 However,
this reasoning misses an important point as to the definition of a
“corporation.” Since a corporation is a fictitious legal person, 107 the
shareholders). On the other hand, their trading partners are often small corporations.
101. For the comparison with the PMBA’s main argument, see supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
102. Gilson, supra note 5, at 647.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 647-48.
105. Professor Gilson articulates the significant role of the reputational mechanism in
the PMBA. See Gilson, supra note 5, at 648.
106. However, it does not mean that there must be product market rationales.
107. See, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (Harvard University Press 1996) (explaining “[t]he ‘personhood’ of
a corporation is a matter of convenience rather than reality . . . .”); Gilson, supra note 5, at
640-41 (“As a formal matter, a corporation is just a long-lived piece of paper on which
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ultimate and real cost-bearer and beneficiary of corporate transactions is
not the corporation, but shareholders (in particular, natural persons). In
addition, in the deep CMS where a controlling shareholder’s economic
interest in a corporation is low, the controlling shareholder’s personal cost
of equity financing could be minimal, even if the corporation’s cost is high.
Consider a controlling shareholder in a bad-law country who would
like to raise external capital. Suppose that the fundamental value108 of
either debt instruments or equity securities that a corporation issues is $10
million. As the reinforced pecking order theory in a bad-law country
implies,109 however, a corporation’s cost of equity finance is substantially
higher than that of debt finance. 110 Put differently, equity issuance is
subject to a deep discount in a capital market due to distrust among market
participants. Accordingly, the corporation would receive less proceeds in
an equity market than in a debt market. Then, for example, while the
corporation receives $10 million through debt instruments, the corporation
could receive only $8 million through equity issuance. In this case, the
additional cost of the equity that the corporation bears is $2 million.
However, it is noteworthy that the extra cost of $2 million when
selecting equity finance will be borne by the “corporation.” A controlling
shareholder’s primary interest may not be the total cost of equity financing
to a corporation, even though it is important to the corporation. Of greater
significance to a controlling shareholder is his personal cost of equity
finance. When a controlling shareholder holds a fractional ownership, α—
which is between 0 (i.e., 0%) and 1 (i.e., 100%)—his personal extra cost in
selecting equity financing over debt financing is only a fraction of a
corporation’s additional cost, $ α x 2 million.111 The rest of the additional
expense will be borne by all of the non-dominant shareholders.
According to the conventional CS model,112 a controlling shareholder
will take most of the benefits and costs occurring in any decision and
transaction made in a controlled corporation because the controlling
appears the corporation’s charter.”).
108. In principle, “[f]undamental value is the price that would prevail if the market
consisted entirely of rational investors who possessed all available information (i.e., the
price that would prevail in a truly efficient market).” Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck,
Bernard Yeung & Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 349 n.47 (2003).
109. As for the reinforced pecking order theory, see supra notes 67-69 and
accompanying text.
110. Gilson, supra note 5, at 647.
111. A controlling shareholder’s personal extra cost and a corporation’s cost in selecting
equity finance are the same only when the shareholder contributes 100% of the equity
capital to the corporation.
112. Recall that cash flow rights and voting rights of a CS controlling shareholder are
approximately aligned.
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shareholder holds the vast majority of the cash flow rights. Here, the
economic incentives of the corporation and the controller are generally
aligned.113 For example, when a controlling shareholder holds 90% of the
economic interest of a corporation, he bears 90% of the additional cost of
capital, i.e., $1.8 million in the example.114 Under these circumstances, if
the controlling shareholder decides to choose equity financing that costs
more than debt financing, the decision to issue new shares would not likely
be made based on a capital market rationale, as the PMBA explains.
Instead, it is probable that the PMBA’s rationale—building a reputation of
integrity in a product market—may be able to explain the controller’s
decision to raise equity capital.115
A limitation of the above explanation is, however, that this view is
incapable of explaining another large subset of controlling shareholder
regimes, i.e., the CMS. In a deep CMS corporation where the cash flow
rights and voting rights of a controlling shareholder are significantly
separated,116 the economic incentive of the corporation and the controlling
shareholder can be substantially detached. Accordingly, the controlling
shareholder’s personal burden in equity finance is only a small part of the
corporation’s cost. Suppose that a CMS controlling shareholder holds only
5% of cash flow rights of a business group. 117 This example is not
uncommon in countries with the CMS. As explained, controlling family
shareholders of large corporate groups in Korea hold 5.04% of ownership
on average.118 A self-interested controlling shareholder’s primary criterion
for judgment when deciding the method of finance is not the corporation’s
cost ($2 million), but his personal cost (0.05 x $2 million = $100,000).119
Therefore, the fact that the cost of equity finance is much higher than that
113. It is a primary reason why managerial agency problems can be rectified more as the
economic interest of a controlling shareholder increases. “Large shareholders thus address
the agency problem in that they both have a general interest in profit maximization, and
enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interest respected.” Andrei Shleifer
& Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 754 (1997).
114. 0.9 x 2 million dollars = 1.8 million dollars.
115. However, it is noteworthy that building reputation of integrity in a product market
is merely a possible answer to the expensive equity financing. For a similar explanation, see
also supra note 106 and its accompanying text.
116. As for the CMS, see supra note 21.
117. In this Article, a “business group” and a “corporate group” are used
interchangeably.
118. See Korea Exchange, supra note 43. As discussed, on average controlling
shareholders in large corporate groups in Korea personally hold 2.62% of economic interest
in groups. Including their family members’ economic interest, the number reaches 5.04%.
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
119. Due to a CMS controlling shareholder’s capability to separate his personal interest
and a corporation’s interest, it is known that a CMS corporation tends to generate serious
corporate governance problems.
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of debt finance to a corporation does not significantly constrain a CMS
controlling shareholder’s desire to raise equity capital. A controlling
shareholder can simply make minority shareholders pay 95% of the extra
cost of equity financing.120
In sum, the question at issue should not be why a “corporation” in a
developing country has many minority shareholders even if the cost of
equity to a “corporation” is substantially (e.g., $2 million) higher than the
cost of debt. The theory of the PMBA is based on this incorrect question.
The more precise question is why a “controlling shareholder” in a
developing country has so many minority shareholders even if the cost of
equity to a “controlling shareholder” is slightly (e.g., $100,000) higher than
the cost of debt to him.121 Under the analysis of this question, a controlling
shareholder’s choice of equity finance is not irrational even from the
capital market perspective, when a corporation’s collective interest and a
controlling shareholder’s private interest are separate. This implies that the
PMBA’s theory is less compelling as an explanation of Gilson’s riddle in
deep CMS regimes.
II. WHY DOES A CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER RELY ON EXPENSIVE
EQUITY FINANCING AND HAVE MANY MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS?
One may argue that, to a controlling shareholder, equity finance is still
more expensive than debt financing, even when his economic interest in a
corporation is significantly low. For instance, in the CMS example above,
a controller has to bear $100,000. An economically reasonable controlling
shareholder—even if he is in a deep CMS—would always choose debt
financing over equity financing since he has no reason to pay even a penny
more. The question then is: why in reality does a controller in a
developing country issue new shares?
A. The Additional Cost of Equity Finance Is Opportunity Cost
One possible answer to Gilson’s riddle is that a controlling
shareholder’s additional cost of equity financing is not out-of-pocket cost.
Consider this account based on the numerical example above.122 It is
120. Another derivative question is how a controlling shareholder is able to set up a
corporate group and the CMS in the first place. Professor Jesse Fried at Harvard Law
School also raised this question during discussion with the Author. The question of
dynamic formation process of a CMS corporate group is beyond the scope of this Article,
and further research will be conducted in an independent project.
121. In Part II, I examine the possibility that equity financing is not costly but beneficial
to a controlling shareholder, when taking other factors into account.
122. See supra notes 108-120 and accompanying text for a numerical example.
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noteworthy that a controlling shareholder’s cost of equity finance—
$100,000—incurs not because he pays $100,000 more to public investors
but because he receives $100,000 less from public investors. Put
differently, the controlling shareholder receives the smaller amount of
proceeds from equity financing although he could have received the larger
amount if he chooses debt financing. In this respect, the additional cost of
equity financing is similar to opportunity cost.
In theory, a rational economic person treats opportunity cost (or
“receiving less” in this example) in the same way as out-of-pocket cost (or
“paying more”). In reality, however, opportunity cost tends to be neglected
to a greater extent than out-of-pocket cost. This tendency could be
reinforced as a controlling shareholder’s economic interest in a corporation
becomes smaller. For example, when the cost of equity finance to a
corporation is $2 million and a controlling shareholder’s economic interest
in the corporation is 1%, his personal opportunity cost is only $20,000.
Accordingly, it is likely that he is less concerned about the cost of equity
finance. In fact, controlling shareholders holding less than 1% of economic
interest are not completely unrealistic, as seen in the aforementioned
example of Chairman Choi, who holds merely 0.04% of economic interest
of SK Group.123
B. Tunneling v. Additional Cost of Equity Financing
Tunneling 124 —the phenomenon where a controlling shareholder
siphons corporate value at the expense of minority shareholders—is
rampant in bad-law countries.125 Having more public shareholders could be
economically beneficial to a controlling shareholder in bad-law
jurisdictions since he may receive more private benefits through tunneling.
However, because prospective investors discount the share price of a
corporation in response to tunneling, equity financing (resulting in more
minority shareholders) is costly to the controlling shareholder.126 Each
party’s response is dynamic and may continue.127 Ultimately, whether the
combination of equity financing and tunneling creates net value to a
controlling shareholder depends on the relative size of both effects.
123. Yun, supra note 46.
124. See generally Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88
J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008) (discussing the anti-self-dealing index); Johnson et al., supra note
12 (describing an overview of tunneling in the controlling investor context).
125. As for insufficient investor protection in controlling shareholder regimes, see, e.g.,
La Porta et al., supra note 1.
126. Recall the pecking order theory. See generally Myers & Majluf, supra note 63; see
also Gilson, supra note 5, at 647.
127. See supra Part I.B.
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Accordingly, there are three scenarios relating to tunneling and equity
financing by a controlling shareholder: (1) a controlling shareholder takes
the exact same amount of private benefits of control via tunneling as the
cost incurred by equity finance (net value to a controller is zero); (2) he
takes more private benefits of control than the equity financing cost (net
value to a controller is positive); or (3) he takes less private benefits of
control than the equity financing cost (net value to a controller is negative).
Since a controlling shareholder knows the size of his tunneling and the
extra cost of equity financing while minority shareholders do not,128 the
controlling shareholder knows the scenario in which he is involved.
Consider the first scenario. A fair equilibrium between a controlling
shareholder and minority shareholders is achieved through the controlling
shareholder’s “disciplined” expropriation—in this respect, the controlling
shareholder is “honest.” Interestingly, the controlling shareholder acts
fairly and honestly in this scenario because he steals exactly the same
amount of corporate assets as the cost that he loses from the discount made
by public investors during the equity issuance, instead of refraining from
stealing at all.129 Because equity financing ultimately is not a bad or
expensive choice to controlling shareholders, Gilson’s riddle is solved in
this first scenario.
Gilson’s riddle is solved in the second scenario as well since a
controlling shareholder attains positive net value after the combination of
equity financing and tunneling. This scenario raises an additional question:
why do minority shareholders accept such unfair transactions in a capital
market? 130 First, this could possibly be because imperfect market
conditions make minority shareholders follow unfair market terms because
either: (1) asymmetric information can obfuscate public investors; or, (2)
the presence of the quasi-monopolistic power of controlling shareholders as
dominant market players may prevent public investors from discounting in
proportion to the extent of controlling shareholders’ expropriation. Second,
minority shareholders may accept such transactions because they are
rationally apathetic individualists. 131 Although the total amount of

128. It could happen because of asymmetric information between a corporate insider
and public investors. As for asymmetric information, see generally Akerlof, supra note 55
(examining deterioration in markets with asymmetric information).
129. In a similar way, Professor Black boldly claims “once a company has issued shares
at a discount, the insiders may feel entitled to appropriate most of the company’s value for
themselves.” Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 806 (2001).
130. As for a further discussion of this question (i.e., the flipside of Gilson’s riddle), see
infra Part III.
131. For an explanation of the rational apathy of shareholders, see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, 32 REGULATION 42, 47 (2009) (explaining that
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corporate value that a controlling shareholder illicitly transfers to himself
from all of the minorities—in other words, the collective damage of all
minorities—might be an important issue to minorities, they are more
interested in their own individual losses caused by a controller’s extraction
when they invest in a corporation. Thus, as long as the expropriation rate
imposed by a controlling shareholder is low, individual minority
shareholders are likely to tolerate such “generous stealing” even though the
collective damage is large.
The analysis has another important implication from the perspective of
a controlling shareholder. Even if a controlling shareholder illicitly takes
only a small amount from each minority shareholder, the aggregate amount
that he steals may be huge when there are many minority shareholders (put
differently, when he is a deep CMS controller). Accordingly, it would be
better for him to be a “generous thief” by reducing his expropriation rate
imposed on individual minorities. If almost all of controllers are thieves, a
generous thief can attract more public investors, enlarging the base of his
expropriation.
These considerations provide an answer to why a
controlling shareholder might voluntarily set a limit to the amount of
private benefits he takes.132
In the third scenario, a controlling shareholder chooses to take less
corporate assets than the cost incurred by equity finance, 133 such that
Gilson’s riddle remains valid. If the controlling shareholder attains benefits
from other sources related to equity financing, then Gilson’s riddle would
be solved. The following Subparts C and D discuss the benefits derived
from business expansion by a controlling shareholder.
C. Non-Pecuniary Private Benefits of Empire-Building
“Empire-building”134 is a phenomenon wherein a top decision-maker
rational apathy is a reasonable option to most of minority shareholders).
132. This question is raised by Professor Gilson in Controlling Family Shareholders in
Developing Countries, supra note 5. Gilson’s answer is based on the PMBA. “Part IV then
speculates on why a controlling family shareholder might voluntarily limit the amount of
private benefit extraction from minority shareholders—not because the treatment of
minority shareholders affects the controlled corporation’s ability to raise additional equity
capital, but because bad behavior will degrade its reputation in the product market.” Id. at
637. In contrast, my answer in this Subpart is based on notions of a controlling shareholder
as a “generous thief” and minority shareholders as rationally apathetic individuals. A
“stationary controller” is another form of “generous thieves.” As for the theory of stationary
controllers, see generally Kang, supra note 27; see also infra Part II.E and Part III.A.
133. Then, it is possible that minority shareholders are not financially damaged by a
controlling shareholder’s expropriation. For the more related explanation of this possibility,
see infra Part III.D.
134. As to the phenomenon of empire-building, Professors Shleifer and Vishny explain
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of a corporation—either a CEO or a controlling shareholder—expands the
size of the corporation for his own interest despite it being inefficient to the
corporation. A controlling shareholder may create both pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits by enlarging the corporation.135 However, this Subpart
pays attention to the non-pecuniary benefits—such as social prestige,
reputation, psychological benefits, and social influence—reaped by a
controlling shareholder.
1. How Can Empire-Building Generate Non-Pecuniary Private
Benefits?
There are several significant points—which are not covered well by
the extant literature—when exploring the impacts of empire-building on the
corporate governance practices of developing countries. First of all, in
many bad-law countries, a small number of corporations—and as a result, a
small number of controlling shareholders—dominate the entire economy,
which is markedly different from the United States. For example, although
Apple (or Microsoft) is one of the largest corporations in the United States,
it is too small to dominate the largest market in the world—as a result,
Steven Jobs (or Bill Gates) is only one of many successful business people
in the economy. 136 In contrast, although the largest corporation in a
developing country is not comparable to Apple (or Microsoft) in terms of
any economic indicator, it may account for a significant portion of a
relatively small market, and so a handful of business tycoons may
command the economy. Due to their unchallenged position, controlling
that “[g]reater costs are incurred when managers have an interest in expanding the firm
beyond what is rational, reinvesting the free cash, pursuing pet projects, and so on.”
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 113, at 742. In the United States, the phenomenon of empirebuilding has been often observed in the M&A context. “[T]he Empire Building Hypothesis
suggests that the most important conflict of interests in corporate control contest may be on
the bidder’s side of the transaction—between the interests of the bidder’s management and
those of its own shareholders.” O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 759 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 2006).
135. Managers often desire to expand the influence of their business by managing large
corporations. In particular, the empire-building account explains that managers in an
acquiring corporation tend to pay a higher takeover premium to a target corporation since
managing a larger corporation is more beneficial to managers. For example, according to
Professors Shleifer & Vishiny, “Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny . . . find that bidder returns
tend to be the lowest when bidders diversify or when they buy rapidly growing firms.”
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 113, at 746 (citing Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
Vishny, Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31 (1990)). As is
widely known, executive compensation is often positively correlated to the size of the
corporations. In addition, corporate insiders can attain more psychological satisfaction by
ruling a larger “empire.”
136. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 4, at 1666.
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shareholders of large corporations in less developed countries are highly
respected and envied, enjoying immense reputation, social prestige, and
other psychological benefits137 (including the jealousy of others). This
tendency can be amplified more in countries with business “groups”
because the economic power is more concentrated among fewer controlling
shareholders who dictate dozens of large affiliated firms.138 In short, being
a controlling shareholder in a large corporation or business group is
psychologically rewarding, and the larger a corporation (or a corporate
group) is, the more non-pecuniary benefits a controlling shareholder can
attain.139
In addition, controlling shareholders are often treated as national
leaders. The disproportionately large economic power of controlling
shareholders makes it possible that, by various means, they have direct
social influence and even political power among people in the street and
the government.140 In many authoritarian regimes,141 which are usually
developing countries, it is true that the government is above the business.142
However, if a few business people are key players in the market, they can
talk directly and personally with the government as its leading partners
despite the hierarchy between the government and business. In extreme
cases, business elites of large corporations become the highest political
figures in their countries. Notable examples are Thaksin in Thailand and
Berlusconi in Italy (although Italy is one of the G-7 economies, it is
recognized by many scholars as a country with insufficient investor

137. As for a related view, see id. Media attention could be another form of nonpecuniary benefits to a controlling shareholder who would like to be famous.
138. Suppose that the size of domestic economies of countries A and B are same. There
are 100 large corporations in countries A and B. Country A is dominated by corporate
groups. Each corporate group has 20 corporations as affiliated firms. Corporations in
country B are stand-alone corporations. Accordingly, there are 5 controlling shareholders in
country A and 100 controlling shareholders in country B. Consequently, country A with the
corporate group system is more concentrated than country B with the stand-alone
corporation system.
139. In this sense, it can be said that the size of a corporation is a proxy of nonpecuniary benefits to a controlling shareholder. For a further discussion of the size of a
corporation, see infra note 148.
140. To the contrary, managers in large U.S. corporations form strong lobbies as a
group, such as Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, but managers are
seldom influential in making policies individually.
141. For a further explanation of the relationship between an authoritarian government
and businesspeople, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically
Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2011)
(examining the interactions and roles of dictators and business elites in developing
countries).
142. An example is the government-business relation in former president Chung-Hee
Park’s regime in Korea. Id.
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protection,143 a jurisdiction at issue in this Article).
Moreover, the length of tenure as a corporate decision-maker makes
empire-building far more attractive to controlling shareholders in
developing countries than to CEOs in the United States. In the United
States, the term of a typical top manager generally lasts for several years.144
In that sense, a business empire is “leased” to him for a short duration. In
contrast, a controlling shareholder in a country with poor investor
protection usually remains the dictator of a corporation for his entire life, if
he wishes. In addition, since a controlling shareholder’s children will
inherit his capacity after he retires or dies, the tenure of a controlling family
shareholder is practically infinite. 145 A controlling shareholder is,
therefore, conceived as “owning” a business empire as his personal
“property.”
A top manager of a large public corporation in the United States is
analogous to a consul in ancient Rome. Although he is influential and may
be the sole decision-maker in a corporation, he must leave the office after a
fixed number of years. Ultimately, Rome is not the consul’s empire but a
people’s republic, even if the republic is under his dictatorship. To the
contrary, a controlling shareholder in a developing country is comparable
to an emperor (or princeps, i.e., the first citizen like Augustus) of Rome.
He can stay in office as long as he is alive, and eventually his children will
succeed his throne—thus, Rome will be maintained as his dynasty. In that
context, a typical corporation in the United States is only a pseudo-empire
to its CEO, because the current CEO in a dispersed shareholding firm is
generally not able to appoint his child as the next CEO.
It is, therefore, clear that building a larger empire will provide more
glory (i.e., non-pecuniary private benefits) to a controlling shareholder in a
controlling shareholder regime than to a top manager in a dispersed
shareholder regime. In addition, it is plausible that the CEO of a widely
held firm does not have sufficient incentive to expand the territory of the
corporate empire in the last period of his term since the fruits of his effort
143. See, e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 113, at 739; Gilson, supra note 4, at 1655.
144. Quoting Booze Allen Hamilton study, Professor Gordon explains that the average
CEO tenure in the United States in 2001 is 7.3 years. The average fired CEO tenure in the
same year is 4.6 years. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950 - 2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Price, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465,
1533 (2007).
145. For example, Gilson’s PMBA in Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing
Countries is based on a notion of a controlling family shareholder as a controller with
infinite tenure. “[F]amily ownership solves the intergenerational transfer process rather
elegantly. Because of intrafamily inheritance and family ties, the current generation of
decision makers, at least in functional family businesses, treats the next generation’s utility
as the equivalent of their own, so there is no temporal distortion of incentives to invest in
reputation.” Gilson, supra note 5, at 643.
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will accrue to the next “consul,” to whom the current one has no biological
relationship. 146 In contrast, a controlling shareholder in developing
countries may have an equal incentive to pursue empire-building
throughout his life since the expanded empire will ultimately belong to his
children.147
2. External Equity Financing Is Essential for Empire-Building
So far, I have explained that a controlling shareholder can attain a
significant part of non-pecuniary benefits by empire-building. How, then,
is empire-building embodied in a concrete way, and what are the
implications of empire-building in relation to equity finance? In general,
large corporations refer to corporations with large assets. 148 From an
accountant’s perspective, as the size of the assets (i.e., the left side of
balance sheet) increases, the sum of the debt and equity (i.e., the right side
of balance sheet) should increase to the same extent.149 According to the
pecking order theory, when external capital is required by a corporation, a
controlling shareholder may initially prefer to rely on debt (especially bank
loans).150 During this period, as assets increase, debt increases to the same
extent, and the size of the equity remains constant. Consequently, a growth
strategy that depends solely on debt financing raises the leverage ratio of a
business group. As the debt-equity ratio deteriorates, however, the
financial distress costs increase.151
A corporation could sustain “high” leverage (e.g., a 500% debt-toequity ratio), even if it creates enormous inefficiency in the capital
structure. However, at some point, a controlling shareholder’s empirebuilding strategy financed solely by debt is impractical for two reasons: (1)
the financial distress costs of “extremely high” leverage (e.g., 5,000% debtto-equity ratio) far exceed the benefits, such that the corporation is unable
to endure the burden;152 and (2) the debt market would no longer make
146. Simply put, in general a CEO faces a final period problem when it comes to
empire-building. See also Gilson, supra note 5, at 641 (but, note that Professor Gilson
explains a corporate insider’s final period problem in relation to the corporation’s
contractual obligations in a product market.).
147. In other words, in general a controlling shareholder does not face a final period
problem. As for a controlling shareholder with an infinite tenure, see supra note 145.
148. A large corporation might be a corporation with a large number of employees,
large sales or assets. Nonetheless, in developing countries, the number of employees and
the magnitude of sales and assets are generally correlated with each other. In that sense, the
size of the assets is a good proxy for measuring the size of the corporation.
149. In short, the assets equals to the sum of liabilities and equities.
150. As for the pecking order theory, see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
151. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 65, at 477.
152. See id.
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loans to the corporation due to the fear of default even if the corporation is
in search of more debt. Accordingly, a controlling shareholder who seeks
dynastic empire-building for him and his offspring eventually has to turn to
equity financing from outside investors in the stock market.153
It is true that the frequency of equity issuance is rare in a controlling
shareholder system.154 To a dispersed shareholding firm’s CEO, who can
remain in that post for only several years,155 the interval between equity
financing looks long. It is possible that a corporation is not going to issue
new shares again within his tenure. The same interval between two equity
issuances, however, looks short to a controlled firm’s dominant shareholder
whose time horizon is infinite. In other words, the frequency of equity
issuance is not deemed to be rare from the standpoint of the controlling
shareholder who (and whose children) will repeatedly participate in the
stock market. A far-sighted controlling shareholder ought to be concerned
about the next equity issuances.156 Accordingly, he has an incentive to
voluntarily protect minority shareholders at least to some degree to attract
public investors in the subsequent share issuances. The need for capital in
a stock market (as opposed to the PMBA)157 explains the decision to have
minority shareholders if dynamism, such as the growth of a corporation
over a long time horizon through dynastic succession, is taken into account.
Although the above explanation is true in some situations, a
controlling shareholder will not rely on external equities when the new
equity threatens his interest as a controlling shareholder. This argument
may be relevant in the CS regime where a typical controlling shareholder
holds a significant amount of shares in a corporation. A controlling
shareholder may decide to issue new shares as long as he is able to
participate in the capital-raising as a dominant investor (who can maintain

153. This Article emphasizes a controlling shareholder’s repeated participation in a
capital market. See infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text. The controller’s conduct in
a capital market can be analyzed by game theory as well. For the broad explanation on
game theory, see generally JOEL WATSON, STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
(W.W. Norton & Co. 2nd ed. 2007) and AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF,
THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY
LIFE (W.W. Norton & Co. 1993).
154. Gilson, supra note 5, at 646.
155. As for a typical CEO’s term in his office, see Gordon, supra note 144, at 1533.
156. Compare with Gilson, supra note 5 at 646 (explaining the skepticism of the
controller’s need “to return to the capital market to raise the capital in the future”).
157. My analysis contrasts with Professor Gilson’s PMBA in Controlling Family
Shareholders in Developing Countries. The PMBA states that a controlling shareholder
does not issue new shares for a capital market rationale (“The decision to have minority
shareholders then can be explained not by the need for capital . . . , but as a way of
developing reputation that will be valuable in the product market . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Gilson, supra note 5, at 648.
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the majority shareholder’s position after the new equity issuance). He
would not let the corporation issue new shares, if, for example, he does not
have enough money to participate in the new equity issuance, since new
issuance would reduce his equity holding under the critical level for
control.
This concern, however, is not very meaningful to a controlling
shareholder in the CMS where a decrease in cash flow rights does not
necessarily dilute a controlling shareholder’s voting rights in the same
proportion.158 A CMS controller is effectively able to entrench his control
position through voting leverage devices such as stock pyramiding. 159
Since new equity issuance does not critically reduce a CMS controller’s
voting rights, equity financing is generally seen as a safe means to attain
the goal of empire-building.
To what extent, then, can a controlling shareholder enlarge his
business when he raises capital from the stock market? A numerical
example can explain the relationship between the size of assets and the
economic interest of a controlling shareholder in a more concrete way.
Suppose that there are three corporations with three controlling
shareholders who invest the same amount of money, $50 million in each
corporation. Three controlling shareholders hold 100%, 50%, and 5% of
common stocks in corporations, respectively. Apparently, the first
controlling shareholder runs a CS-style corporation, whereas the third runs
a CMS-style corporation.160 Then, the total equity of each corporation
should be $50 million, $100 million, and $1 billion, correspondingly. If
each corporation is allowed to finance debts by 400% equity-to-debt ratio,
the total assets of each corporation will be $250 million, $500 million, and
$5 billion, respectively.

158. Put differently, a controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights could be less than 50%
without his participation in new equity issuance. Due to the feature of one-share-multiplevote for a CMS controller, however, he can still maintain control by holding more than 50%
voting rights.
159. Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 3. For a further analysis of a CMS controller’s
entrenched control in M&A context, see generally Kang, supra note 53.
160. In this example, for the sake of simplicity a CS corporation is defined as a
corporation where a controlling shareholder’s economic interest is more than 50%. A CMS
corporation is a corporation where a controlling shareholder’s economic interest is less than
50%. Therefore, it can be said that the second controlling shareholder runs either a CS or a
CMS corporation.
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TABLE 2: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER’S
ECONOMIC INTEREST AND THE SIZE OF A CORPORATE EMPIRE

CORP. 1

CORP. 2

Amount of a
Controlling
Shareholder’s
Equity

$ 50 million

$ 50 million

$ 50 million

Controlling
Shareholder’s
Economic Interest

100%

50%

5%

Type of a
Corporation’s
Ownership

CS

CS / CMS

CMS

Total Equity of a
Corporation

$ 50 million

$ 100 million

$ 1 billion

Total Debt of a
Corporation

$ 200 million

$ 400 million

$ 4 billion

Total Asset Size
(Asset = Equity +
Debt)

$ 250 million

$ 500 million

$ 5 billion

CORP. 3

Although these three controllers contribute the same value of capital,
the third controlling shareholder who has 95% of equity from nondominant shareholders has an empire that is twenty times larger than that of
the first who has no minorities at all. Accordingly, the third controlling
shareholder attains much larger non-pecuniary benefits than the first, since
non-pecuniary benefits are positively related to the size of a corporation
over which a controlling shareholder exercises control. In consideration of
non-pecuniary private benefits, the optimal choice for a controlling
shareholder is to maintain the least cash flow rights in the corporation as
long as his control is assured, other things being equal. In addition,
although most of the assets (99%) consist of other people’s money (i.e.,
equity and debt) in the third corporation, the only person who is able to
consume non-pecuniary benefits exclusively is the third controller.161 The
lesson is clear. Having more external capital from an equity market
161. In Corporation 3, a controlling shareholder’s capital contributed is $50 million and
the corporation’s total assets are $5 billion (equity = $1 billion, debt = $4 billion). Thus, a
controlling shareholder’s equity is only 1% of the corporation’s total assets although he
holds 5% of the corporation’s equity.
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benefits a controlling shareholder in a sense that it increases the territory
(i.e., the assets) of his empire. The more equity capital a controlling
shareholder has in his controlled corporation, the more debt he can bring
into the corporation, and the larger corporation he would run. This
provides more non-pecuniary benefits to him.162 Therefore, ceteris paribus,
a controlling shareholder in a developing country may have an incentive to
attract more minority shareholders, despite expensive equity financing.
3. Empire-Building and Its Cost—If Inefficient, Who Bears the Cost
and by How Much?
In general, empire-building is understood as the corporate insiders’
strategy of pursuing size maximization by adopting even negative NPV
(net present value) projects. Hence, the normative standard of the profit
maximization is sacrificed.163 For example, managers in the United States
in the 1960s commonly became preoccupied with conglomeration (i.e.,
empire-building).164 This wave of U.S. M&A is thought to have caused a
significant level of inefficiency in the economy through unrelated
diversification. The next wave of M&A in the 1980s was mainly designed
to rectify the inefficiency problem by means of divestiture.165 Since then, it
has become common sense that unrelated diversification reduces
profitability.166 “Focus” has been treated as a more reliable business norm
than “diversification.”167 On the other hand, some of business groups—

162. Equity financing is essential for attaining more debt from outside. Suppose that the
debt-to-equity ratio is maintained at 400%. Then, when a corporation issues $1 million of
new equities, practically it is entitled to have additional $4 million through subsequent debt
financing. As the sum of equity and debt increases, the size of firm (the asset size) also
increases. Through this empire-building, a controller’s non-pecuniary benefits increase. As
a result, equity financing is a solid foundation for debt financing and non-pecuniary
benefits.
163. Empire-building of corporations is embodied by diversification through
conglomerates or business groups. The prevailing view in economics, management, and
corporate governance is that corporate diversification destructs corporate value. For this
view, see generally Morck et al., supra note 135; Larry H. P. Lang & Rene M. Stulz,
Tobin’s Q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248
(1994).
164. For a brief explanation of merger waves including the conglomerate merger wave,
see Bernard S. Black, The First International Merger Wave (and the Fifth and Last U.S.
Wave), 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1999).
165. For a brief description of the merger wave in the 1980s, see id.
166. Tarun Khanna & Jan W. Rivkin, Estimating the Performance Effects of Business
Groups in Emerging Markets, 22. STRAT. MGMT. J. 45, 45 (2001).
167. For an explanation of this Western norm, see generally Tarun Khanna & Krishna
Palepu, Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets, 75 HARV. BUS. REV.
41 (1997); Khanna & Palepu, supra note 62.
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results of empire-building, such as Korean chaebols—have achieved great
success in the global market. Whether empire-building is ultimately
efficient or not is still a difficult question to resolve. Putting aside that
complicated debate, this Article’s analyses are in principle based on the
assumption that empire-building is inefficient, and thus costly to all
shareholders, including controlling shareholders. 168 Nonetheless, a
controlling shareholder still has an incentive to continue unrelated
diversification due to the disproportional features of his personal payoff
scheme.
Consider a controlling shareholder’s cost-benefit analysis in relation
to empire-building. On the one hand, virtually all non-pecuniary benefits
ultimately belong to a controlling shareholder exclusively, no matter his
economic interest in a corporation.169 On the other hand, the cost of the
incremental inefficiency of expanding the empire is shared among all
shareholders according to their pro-rata economic interest in a corporation.
As a result, a controlling shareholder may find it more attractive to pursue
empire-building when his economic interest in a business group is small.
When a controlling shareholder has a deep CMS by having more minority
shareholders, empire-building is more advantageous to him. In this respect,
Gilson’s riddle—why a controlling shareholder in a developing country has
so many minority shareholders despite the high expense of equity
financing—is at least partially solved.
Why then do public investors tolerate the inefficiency cost of empirebuilding by being minority shareholders? If all corporations in a domestic
market are indulged in inefficient empire-building, then public investors
have no other choices unless international investment is available to them.
In addition, while the cost that all minority shareholders should bear as a
group is huge, the individual cost of each minority shareholder is small.
For example, under a CMS controlling shareholder with 5% economic
interest, the cost of inefficient empire-building that one minority
shareholder should bear can be minimal since the burden is widely spread
out among the 95% minority shareholders.
D. Other Benefits of Empire-Building
In addition to non-pecuniary benefits, empire-building can provide
economic benefits and insurance to a controlling shareholder. In this
respect, a controlling shareholder has an incentive to rely on equity finance.
168. Nonetheless, it does not mean that every empire-building endeavor is inefficient.
This controversial topic, though important, is beyond the scope of this Article.
169. It is assumed that a controlling shareholder attains the entire non-pecuniary benefits
irrespective of whether his economic interest in a corporation is 5% or 100%.

KANG_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER REGIME

6/3/14 10:18 AM

879

1. Economic Benefits of Empire-Building
Empire-building is business expansion including vertical and
horizontal integration. It is theoretically possible that up to some point
vertical and horizontal integration can generate efficiency through synergy
based on the economies of scale and scope. Another compelling defense
for forming business groups is that they help to resolve the problems
caused by the absence or poor functioning of institutions that corporate
insiders in developed economies take for granted.170 For instance, given
that there is no efficient capital market in developing countries, business
groups can add value by having their own internal capital markets.171
Business groups are also useful to affiliated entities since developing a
common brand is valuable in particular in export-oriented countries.172
Business groups which are seen as indulging in their passion for empirebuilding may generate some efficiency for their shareholders, although it is
still uncertain whether the total effect of empire-building for all of
constituencies in a society is efficient.
In a developing country, it is often advantageous for a corporation to
be involved in unrelated diversification since the corporation can obtain
economic rent from the expansion. For example, as the size of assets
increases, a corporation may have more opportunities to raise more debts at
more preferential terms (e.g., cost of capital) because: (1) a corporation
with large assets is able to provide more securities (collateral) for the new
debts to lenders who are less able to valuate borrowers’ ability to repay
debts than those in a developed country; (2) as the magnitude of debt
increases, ironically a corporation may have more negotiation leverage visà-vis lenders;173 and (3) the government simply allocates scarce capital to
only large corporations, rather than best-performing corporations, in the
form of industrial policies.
A large corporation has more chances to obtain licenses to new
businesses that are profitable and protected by the government. In addition,
a large corporation is likely to generate excess profits via monopolistic
power since wealth transfer takes place from trading partners and
170. Khanna & Palepu, supra note 62, at 129; see also Khanna & Palepu, supra note
167, at 41 (“Western companies take for granted a range of institutions that support their
business activities, but many of these institutions are absent in other regions of the world.”).
171. See Khanna & Palepu, supra note 62, at 134 (introducing an example of a business
group’s internal capital market in Chile); see also Khanna & Rivkin, supra note 166, at 49
(explaining that a business group can provide an internal capital market and an internal labor
market).
172. Khanna & Palepu, supra note 62, at 129.
173. As a finance maxim goes, if you borrow $1000, you are only a debtor to a creditor.
However, if you borrow $1,000,000, you might be a partner to a creditor.
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consumers to a large corporation. Moreover, a large corporation is at an
advantage to attain subsidies or other preferential treatments from the
government at the expense of general taxpayers. As long as these windfalls
accrue to a large “corporation” (rather than to a controlling shareholder
individually), ultimate beneficiaries are the entire shareholders. In this
sense, empire-building can be “efficient” to shareholders even though
economic rent that makes shareholders better off is indeed detrimental to a
society.174
This implication is of significance in two ways. First, a controlling
shareholder has an incentive to rely on expensive equity financing since
equity financing builds his empire and he can gain economic rent on a prorata basis. Second, it means that minority shareholders can free-ride on a
controlling shareholder when he collects economic rent and share the
benefits from empire-building. In turn, public investors may have
incentives to be non-controlling shareholders even if there is some level of
tunneling by a controller.175
2. Too-Big-To-Fail: Insurance for a Controlling Shareholder
Another related topic in empire-building is the principle of too-largeto-fail. Even the United States (a champion of laissez-faire) has
experienced a series of bailouts for large corporations when a failure of a
large corporation was likely to affect its economy. Notable examples
include bailouts of Chrysler, LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management),
and AIG (American International Group).176 In many developing countries,
a large corporation or business group constitutes a higher percentage of the
domestic economy than one in the United States. Thus, there are
compelling reasons that the government in an emerging market is more
afraid of the collapse of a large corporation or business group. For
example, the dire consequence of a failure of Salim Group, 177 a large
174. The size of a slice of a pie for shareholders increases while the size of the pie for
the entire society may shrink.
175. For more reasons why minority shareholders participate in a capital market with
insufficient investor protection, see infra Part III.
176. Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. Hilsenrath, U.S.
to Take Over A.I.G. in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122156561931242905.
“Just last weekend, the government essentially pulled the plug on Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., allowing the big investment bank to go under instead of giving it financial
support. This time, the government decided A.I.G. truly was too big to fail.” Id.
177. For a further explanation of Salim Group and its founder, see Eric Bellman, An
Indonesian Tycoon Dies: Liem Sioe Liong, Ally of Dictator Suharto, Built Country’s Biggest
Conglomerate,
WALL
S T.
J.
(June
11,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303444204577460351515148464.
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business group in Indonesia, would be much more devastating than that of
the failure of Chrysler (or perhaps even a large bank) in the United States.
Aware of the government’s fear of their possibility of failing, a large
corporation’s controlling shareholder may conclude that empire-building
can function as effective “insurance” for its survival.
In this context, minority shareholders may be used as “hostages” by a
controlling shareholder. If a corporation has a broad base of minority
shareholders, then a corporation and its controlling shareholder are more
likely to be treated favorably by the government even if the government–
business relationship is initially unfriendly. For example, when a corporate
scandal is investigated by an honest and uncorrupt government that is not
connected with the business, the corporation can convincingly argue that
more investigation and punishment of the corporation and its controlling
shareholder would affect the entire economy adversely. The more minority
shareholders a controlling shareholder has, the more credible this threat
may be. Hence, a controlling shareholder has another reason to attract
minority shareholders by providing some protection to minorities.
E. Stationary Controlling Shareholders
An important question related to Gilson’s riddle is: why would a
controlling shareholder in a bad-law jurisdiction set the limit of
expropriation voluntarily even though the poor legal system in the
jurisdiction does not regulate his expropriation efficiently?178 To answer to
this question from another aspect, I use an analytical framework borrowed
from political economics in the context of corporate governance.179 In
explaining the evolution of government systems, Professor Mancur Olson
creates the terms “roving bandits” and “stationary bandits.”180 “Roving
bandits” are bandits who depart soon and will not come to expropriate the
same victims again.181 Thus, it is in roving bandits’ interest to take all of
178. In a previous Subpart, this question is solved in part. See supra note 132 and
accompanying text.
179. This Subpart is explained based on Kang, supra note 27 (attempting to solve the
puzzle that in jurisdictions with insufficient investor protection, some controlling
shareholders voluntarily extract public shareholders less than other controlling shareholders,
using the analytical framework of banditry).
180. As for “roving bandits” and “stationary bandits,” see MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND
PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIP 7 (2000); see
generally Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 567 (1993) (exploring the social and economic incentives created by roving bandits
who engage in total plundering under the “uncoordinated competitive theft” in anarchic
conditions versus those created by stationary bandits, who rationalize theft in the form of
partial and periodic taxes).
181. See Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, supra note 180, at 568.
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their victims’ wealth at once. In contrast to short-sighted roving bandits,
“stationary bandits” stay with victims for a long time and continuously
expropriate victims. 182 With an encompassing interest in victims’
prosperity, stationary bandits take a part of victims’ wealth in the form of
regular tax. 183 As a result, victims prefer stationary bandits to roving
bandits although both stationary bandits and roving bandits are same in the
sense that they are thieves.184
Consider the analytical framework of banditry in the context of
corporate governance. From the perspective of conventional corporate
governance scholarship, a controlling shareholder regime in developing
countries is systematically inferior to a dispersed shareholder regime.185
This view often emphasizes tunneling where a controlling shareholder can
illicitly transfer substantially all assets from a corporation to himself if he
wishes. 186 However, this view should be carefully interpreted in
developing countries, since having the capacity to rely on total plundering
does not necessarily mean using that capacity.187 Instead, it is more precise
to explain that controlling shareholders in developing countries can be
categorized into at least two types.
Take into account the first type of controllers in bad-law jurisdictions.
Suppose that a controller has a short time horizon for some reason. Then,
it is often in his best interest to quickly loot his controlled corporation to
the fullest extent via a massive one-shot transaction. As a result, he has no
reason to expropriate minority shareholders again because they do not hold
any wealth in a corporation which is entirely looted. In this respect, the
controlling shareholder is a “roving controller.”188 In contrast, a controlling
shareholder with a long time horizon has often an encompassing interest in
the prosperity of minority shareholders.
He stays with minority
shareholders in a more constructive way and maintains control over a
corporation for a long time. This type of a controlling shareholder is
referred to as a “stationary controller” who chooses a form of theft by
taking only part of corporate value periodically. 189 Accordingly, a
stationary controller can enjoy non-pecuniary benefits—unavailable for a

182. Id.
183. Id. at 568-570.
184. See id. at 568.
185. See La Porta et al., supra note 1, at 1151 (concluding that the results of the authors’
empirical study “support the idea that heavily concentrated ownership results from, and
perhaps substitutes for, weak protection of investors in a corporate governance system”).
186. See Johnson et al., supra note 12, at 22.
187. See generally Kang, supra note 27.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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roving controller—as well as pecuniary benefits.190
Then, examine how a self-interested controlling shareholder decides to
be roving or stationary. Initially, a controlling shareholder may compare
(1) the amount gained by a one-shot tunneling with (2) the present value of
cumulative extractions in the long run and other benefits (e.g., nonpecuniary benefits). When the latter is larger than the former, he would
choose to be stationary.191 In order to understand a stationary controller’s
expropriation policy, reviewing a rational government’s tax policy is a
useful way.192 Tax revenue is the product of a tax rate and taxable income;
however, a high tax rate does not necessarily generate high tax revenue,
since it gives taxpayers less incentive to work (i.e., taxable income will
shrink).193 The same logic applies to the relationship between an extraction
rate and the amount of tunneling (i.e., pecuniary benefits); the amount of
tunneling is equal to the product of an extraction rate and the extractable
corporate value. 194 Thus, a high extraction rate does not necessarily
generate a high amount of tunneling, since that would cause noncontrolling shareholders to withdraw their investments (i.e., extractable
corporate value will shrink).195 Therefore, a rational stationary controller
sets the optimal extraction rate carefully (generally at a moderate level) in
order to maximize his “tax revenue” (i.e., the amount of tunneling) in the
long run.196
190. Id.
191. Id. The following explanation is based on Kang, supra note 27. Suppose that a
controller extracts the entire corporate assets (e.g., $100 million) immediately if he takes a
one-shot transaction to the total detriment of minority shareholders. After this transaction,
the corporation will be left as a shell without any valuable assets. In this case, he is a roving
controller. Alternatively, he can extract a part of corporate assets (e.g., $5 million) annually
by means of ongoing tunneling. By doing so, he becomes a stationary controller. Under
these circumstances, the controlling shareholder will choose to be stationary as long as he
believes that he can maintain ongoing extractions for more than twenty years (if the discount
rate is assumed to be zero for the sake of simplicity). In addition, if the utility of the nonpecuniary benefits for a controller and his family is taken into consideration, he will find
that looting based on a one-shot extraction is less attractive. For example, suppose that the
amount of looting from a one-shot transaction is $100 million and the present value of sum
of extractions is $80 million. As long as the utility of non-pecuniary benefits is evaluated to
be more than $20 million, a controller will be willing to be stationary even if being a roving
controller is financially more advantageous to him.
192. Id.
193. See generally Arthur B. Laffer, The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future, 1765
BACKGROUNDER (2004), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/06/thelaffer-curve-past-present-and-future.
194. See Kang, supra note 27.
195. Id.
196. For a further analysis of a rational stationary controller’s “tax policy,” see id. The
presence of non-pecuniary private benefits of control may alter a controller’s tax policy to
some degree.
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In other words, if a controlling shareholder is a repeat-player staying
with minority shareholders, he is not ruthless and has a strong incentive to
care for his “continuing victims.” In this way, it is understood that a
stationary controller sets the limit of expropriation voluntarily even if the
poor legal system in the jurisdiction does not regulate his expropriation
efficiently.197 If a controller expects family inheritance, by definition he is
often a stationary controller who stays with minority shareholders for a
long time.198 In addition, it is likely that he will continue to rely on equity
financing with limited stealing. Then, he (and his descendants) would end
up with a large number of minority shareholders, which would be
beneficial to him (and his descendants) since minority shareholders are the
foundation for the stationary controller’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary
benefits. In this respect, the stationary controller’s account also provides a
useful solution to Gilson’s riddle as to why a controlling shareholder needs
minority shareholders despite expensive equity finance.
III. WHY DO MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS PARTICIPATE IN CAPITAL
MARKETS DESPITE POOR PROTECTION?
Part II analyzes, from the standpoint of a controlling shareholder, why
he has incentives to “voluntarily” accept the minimum level of minority
protection and attract more minority shareholders to invest in his controlled
corporation even though the cost of equity is high to a controller.
Transactions in a capital market are not made in a single direction by only a
seller’s decision. Now it is fair to ask from the standpoint of minority
shareholders, why they “voluntarily” participate as equity buyers in a
capital market where they are expected to be expropriated by a controlling
shareholder.
A. Minority Shareholders under a Stationary Controller
As mentioned previously,199 there are at least two types of controlling
shareholders in bad-law jurisdictions: roving controllers and stationary
controllers. Faced with a rational stationary controller’s benevolent
extraction in the long run, minority shareholders are willing to invest in a

197. See id. This explanation is also related to a potential solution for the flipside of
Gilson’s riddle since controllers’ “generous stealing” may encourage public investors in a
bad-law country to participate in a capital market. For a further discussion of a stationary
controller’s role in the context of the flipside of Gilson’s riddle, see infra Part III.A.
198. Kang, supra note 27.
199. See supra Part II.E (discussing stationary controlling shareholders). The following
explanation in this Subpart (Part III.A) is also based on Kang, supra note 27.
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corporation run by a stationary controller as long as the return on the stock
after expropriation is comparable to the return on investments in other
opportunities. 200 However, an important problem is that prospective
investors do not know whether the controlling shareholder that they are
dealing with is stationary or roving. Under this asymmetric information,
prospective investors would hesitate to participate in a capital market even
when a truly stationary controller issues new equities due to the fear of
dealing with a roving bandit. Knowing this, even a sincere stationary
controller might be discouraged from issuing new equities and having
public minorities.201
In this context, a controlling “family” shareholder has a comparative
advantage.202 Since a controlling family shareholder is a repeat-player,
prospective investors would understand that the current controlling
shareholder is unlikely to kill the “proverbial golden goose” due to the
hope that it will continue to lay eggs for him and his children eternally.203
To be sure, it is impossible for investors to know the intent of a controlling
shareholder whether he wishes to be roving or stationary.204 However,
investors can discover whether a given corporation is a family business by
reviewing the corporate governance structure (e.g., how shares are spread
among family members, whether children of a founder are managers or
directors of a corporation).205 Once investors recognize the presence of a
controlling family shareholder, they are likely to deem the controller to be
stationary. Subsequently, investors would participate in the equity market
to gain returns under a more generous stationary controller. As a result, the
flipside of Gilson’s riddle (why minority shareholders participate in a
seemingly unfair capital market where they are not protected) is solved to
some degree. In sum, the game is likely to be beneficial to both minority
shareholders and a family controller.206

200. For the more explanation for the returns of stock and other asset classes and their
impact on the investment decision by public investors, see infra Part III.B.
201. For this vicious circle of interaction between public investors and a controlling
shareholder in a bad-law jurisdiction, see Kang, supra note 27.
202. Id.
203. Nonetheless, there are some circumstances that could make it difficult for a
controlling family shareholder to be a stationary controller. For a further explanation, see
generally id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Benefits for a stationary controller (in particular a family controller) are already
discussed supra Part II.E.
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B. Imperfect Alternative Investments
Perhaps, if controlling shareholders extract investors, then prospective
investors may avoid investing in the stock market, and may seek
investment opportunities from alternative asset classes, such as bank
deposits, debt securities, and real estate. Theoretically, this phenomenon
would be more apparent when investors’ risk-adjusted return of equity is
lower than that of alternative investments.207 Nonetheless, there are several
perceivable reasons why prospective minority shareholders are unable to
totally shun investing in the stock market.
While bank deposits are a very safe investment, they generate low
returns. Although the risk-adjusted return of bank deposits is higher than
that of equity investment in some cases, investing solely in bank deposits is
not a workable option for investors who need to meet a certain amount of
“absolute” return. As a result, at least some investors reallocate their
wealth from bank deposits to stocks, which generate higher absolute
returns. Investment in debt securities, such as government and corporate
bonds, has similar problems. Therefore, there are many minority
shareholders in developing countries despite controllers’ tunneling in
corporations.
In addition, in a bad-law country, if equity investment is impaired due
to controllers’ extraction, it is likely that investment in other assets is
scathed as well. For example, when laws do not protect minority
shareholders (i.e., public investors in a stock market), creditors of
corporations (e.g., public investors in a bond market) are likely to be
subject to a similar risk. In that case, an alternative investment in a bond
market would not generate higher risk-adjusted return than stocks, let alone
higher absolute return.
Investors often see real estate as an attractive alternative to a stock
market as well. However, the problem is that since the value of specific
real estate generally accounts for a huge portion of an individual’s
wealth,208 many investors are exposed to huge idiosyncratic risk. Even
worse, real estate is a very illiquid asset. Thus, investors take the risk of
selling real estate at a deep discount in an emergency. For these reasons,
investing in real estate is not fit for many ordinary investors, who are not
sufficiently wealthy to deal with these risks. In developed economies,

207. In this Article, alternative investments are meant to be investments in any asset
other than stocks. Thus, for example, an investment in bonds is treated as an alternative
investment, let alone an investment in real estate.
208. Suppose that an investor’s single real estate investment (e.g., a house) accounts for
70% of his personal wealth. If the value of that real estate was adversely affected by some
macroeconomic problems, it would significantly affect the investor’s total wealth.
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these problems may be well solved by the liquid and thick mortgage
markets and indirect real estate investment tools such as Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs). However, this has not been the case for many
bad-law economies until the recent past.
In sum, equity is not the only imperfect asset in a country with
insufficient investor protection, and investing in assets other than stocks is
not always feasible.
Therefore, investors should choose optimal
combinations among imperfect assets including stocks, even if returns from
investment in stocks are impaired by controllers’ expropriation. Since an
overarching principle of finance is diversification between classes of assets
in order to eliminate unsystematic risks, putting equities in an investment
pool is beneficial to investors even when alternative investments are sound
and feasible.
One may argue, if controllers scathe domestic stocks through
tunneling, investors may shun domestic stocks and invest internationally.
In addition, international investment is beneficial to investors because
adding international assets enhances risk-adjusted return. 209 In reality,
however, many jurisdictions with poor law have established regulations on
the outflows of their citizen’s investment.210 Even in countries without
tight capital regulations, domestic investors would find it difficult to invest
significantly in assets abroad for the following reasons.
Most of all, domestic investors have insufficient information about
potential foreign investments, so they are less confident in investments in
foreign markets. In addition, home bias 211 reinforces the tendency of
domestic investors to invest mainly in domestic assets, even if international
investment can provide higher risk-adjusted return. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that international investment mainly supplements domestic
investments. Put differently, international investment is more appropriate
for affluent people whose wealth needs additional diversification after
investing the vast majority of their assets in a domestic market. In contrast,
many potential non-controlling shareholders in developing countries are

209. For the explanation on the international diversification, see generally Haim Levy &
Marshall Sarnat, International Diversification, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 668 (1970).
210. For example, Korean government restricted international capital flows before the
Asian financial crisis. Taiwan restricted international capital flows and liberalized them in
the end of the 1990s. Rui Castro, Gian Luca Clementi & Glenn MacDonald, Investor
Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth, 119 Q. J. ECON. 1131, 1156, 1156
n.18 (2004).
211. Home bias is the phenomenon that investors tend to invest the vast majority of
capital in assets in domestic countries. It is a special version of familiarity bias where
investors tend to invest the vast majority of capital in assets that they are familiar with. As
for familiarity bias, see Gur Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. STUD.
659, 659-60 (2001).
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middle class investors who would be less able to invest their capital for
diversification beyond domestic investments.212 Even worse, the currency
risks posed by international investment could be another obstacle for small
individual investors to overcome, if they do not have sources to hedge
against these risks.213 These problems would be more severe when an
undeveloped capital market in a developing country does not provide small
individual investors with efficient collective investment tools, such as
funds that specialize in and diversify foreign equities. Consequently,
unless controlling shareholders extract to an extreme degree, potential
investors have an incentive to participate in a domestic capital market as
non-controlling shareholders.
C. Behavioral Finance Problems That Public Investors Are Subject to
Modern standard finance theories are built on core assumptions such
as rational investors and perfect information.214 However, the real-world
experiences and psychological research of human behavior have shown that
these assumptions often do not hold.215 Realizing the limitations of modern
standard finance, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky pose a new theory
of behavioral finance. They argue that individuals are inclined to misjudge

212. Indeed, there are international diversification benefits to investors investing in
equity markets abroad. As is widely known, however, the requirements of international
diversification are the willingness and ability to take the greater risks that arise from
international investment. Wealthy investors in developed countries are able (and willing) to
be involved in international diversification, but many minority shareholders in developing
countries are not.
213. It is known that the success of international investment has depended heavily on the
performance of foreign exchange in a country wherein investors invest. Since the volatility
of foreign exchange has been great, the risk associated with investing in international
investment has been large. Thus, in principle international investment has required
investors to have more willingness and capacity to take risks.
214. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 718 (2002). Based on these
assumptions, modern standard finance relies on three theoretical pillars: the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (“CAPM”), the Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance Propositions, and the Efficient
Market Hypothesis (“EMH”). Id. As to the EMH, Professor Jensen famously states, “the
efficient market hypothesis is the best established fact in all of the social sciences.” Andrei
Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP.
19, 19 (1990).
215. For example, Herbert Simon describes that “human behavior is intendedly rational,
but only boundedly so.” HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 88 (4th ed. 1997).
“Behavioral models of financial markets consider not only how people should act but also
how they do act. People do not always behave rationally, and although departures from
rationality are sometimes random, they are often systematic.” Brad M. Barber & Terrance
Odean, The Courage of Misguided Conviction, 55 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 41, 41 (1999).
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an asset’s value due to cognitive biases and heuristics. 216 Based on
behavioral finance issues, public investors in bad-law countries are likely to
invest in domestic equity markets as non-controlling shareholders even if
extraction by the controller renders the shares unworthy of investment.
Most individuals have a tendency to be overconfident—they believe
that they are more competent, knowledgeable and proficient than they
actually are.217 Likewise, investors in a bad-law country would like to
purchase stocks since they are confident in their forecasting capability,
even if those stocks are volatile and subject to serious tunneling risk. In
addition, names of large conglomerates appear in the national media every
day, and the advertisements of those conglomerates repeatedly influence
people in domestic markets. Then, familiarity bias218 holds, and investors
invest their wealth in shares of such conglomerates despite controlling
shareholders’ exploitation. Home bias, 219 explained above, is another
reason that prospective investors in bad-law countries invest in the
domestic capital market. Once investors purchase shares, it is likely that
they are also subject to status quo bias even if the shares’ performance is
disappointing due to corporate governance problems incurred by
controllers.
Moreover, minority shareholders often play the role of noise traders.220
Based on fads and sentiments, investors might invest in shares issued by
large family conglomerates even if rational information indicates that
domestic corporations are subject to a high risk of expropriation. When
some noise traders earn high returns, many investors might follow those
noise traders’ trading patterns, ignoring the fact that those successful
traders took excessive risk and were just lucky.221 Buying shares of a
216. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 214, at 724; Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974)
(describing how the usage of heuristics and biases can lead to errors in judgment); see also
Barber & Odean supra note 215, at 41 (explaining that people often deviate from rationality
in a systematic way).
217. “Psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own
relative abilities, and unreasonably optimistic about their futures.” Colin Camerer & Dan
Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON.
REV. 306, 306 (1999).
218. As for familiarity bias, see generally Huberman, supra note 211 (explaining home
bias and familiarity bias).
219. Familiarity bias and home bias are closely related. “[R]ecent research suggests that
home bias may be part of a larger phenomenon in which investors exhibit a preference for
familiar companies.” Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, How Distance, Language, and
Culture Influence Stockholdings and Trades, 56 J. FIN. 1053, 1053 (2001) (citation omitted).
220. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 214, at 724 (explaining that noise traders “make
investment decisions that deviate from those that theory would predict of rational
investors”).
221. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 214, at 25.
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family-controlled corporation in a bad-law country is often analogous to
gambling.222 Whereas almost all gamblers know that they will lose on the
average, most potential minority shareholders in a stock market believe that
their expected return is positive even if controllers manipulate the game
and the risk-adjusted return is lower than it should be. In this way, more
prospective investors gamble in the stock market casino as non-controlling
shareholders.
D. Minority Shareholders Are Looted, But They Buy Shares at
Discount
In Subpart A through C, I explained reasons why minority
shareholders participate in a stock market even if they are subject to serious
expropriation risk by a controller. In this Subpart, however, I explore the
possibility that minority shareholders in bad-law jurisdictions actually
might not be damaged financially. Professor Coffee puts forward a
counterintuitive but creative account: the public shareholders buy their
shares at a “bargain” price, which already reflects the likelihood that the
controlling shareholder will expropriate wealth in the future;223 thus, “the
public shareholders would receive an undeserved ‘windfall’ if legal rules
were revised to entitle them to a proportionate share of corporate assets and
distributions.”224 In other words, even if the price of minority shares is
lower than their fundamental value due to controllers’ extraction, minority
shareholders would not suffer since they purchase those shares at a
depressed price for that same reason.225 Therefore, as Professor Coffee
explains, “[f]rom an efficiency perspective, it may be clear that the
economy will do better if the minority is protected, but from a normative
perspective, the respective entitlements of the majority and the minority
can be debated endlessly.”226
I essentially agree with this insightful opinion. However, I think that
additional analysis of the impact of “volatility of expropriation” on public
investors is needed for further clarification. Suppose that there are three
investors, “Investor A,” “Investor B,” and “Investor C.” They buy and sell
222. See, e.g., ECONOMIST, Casino Capital: China’s Financial Market Are Wild—and
Often Less than Wonderful (Feb. 6, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1559717.
223. Coffee, supra note 35, at 659; see also Black, supra note 129, at 806 (using an
example from Coffee, supra note 35, at 657-59).
224. Coffee, supra note 35, at 659.
225. For example, assume that the intrinsic price of a corporation’s shares is $100.
Suppose that the current price of shares of the corporation for minority shareholders is $70
due to the controlling shareholder’s expropriation. However, it does not mean that minority
shareholders lose their wealth if their purchasing price was $70.
226. Coffee, supra note 35, at 659.
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shares of Corporation “XYZ” controlled by a controlling shareholder.
Initially, A holds shares (at time 1), and sells them to B (at time 2).
Finally, B sells them to C (at time 3). Suppose that the controlling
shareholder partially extracts firm value at time 1 and time 2, but he
appropriates almost all of the firm value at time 3. A lenient level of
extraction already has been reflected in the share price in the form of a
discount when A and B purchased shares, thus A and B might not be
financially damaged. However, C would be seriously injured because the
extraction at the time of sale is greater than at the time of purchase (i.e.,
buy high and sell low). If the ex post degree of looting is far beyond the
investors’ ex ante expectations, or if the controlling shareholders
unexpectedly transfer corporate wealth through a one-time extraction,
minority shareholders are clearly damaged, which is not explained in
Coffee’s account.227
In this respect, the notion of family (i.e., a repeat-player) in business
groups is important again. As discussed earlier, a controlling family
shareholder with inheritance usually exploits minority shareholders as a
stationary controller, since partial extraction is more beneficial to a
controller with a long term horizon than total extraction in terms of joint
utility of pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits. In this case of
“stable expropriation,” therefore, it is likely that C buys a share at the
discounted price and he will sell at the similar discounted price, meaning
that C is not financially damaged.228
E. Foreign Minority Shareholders
Although equities in bad-law countries are scathed by poor corporate
governance, a large number of foreign investors invest in such securities.
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that foreign investors are
able to purchase shares at a relevant discounted price even if there are
corporate governance problems. Simply put, foreign investors are not very
concerned about the expropriation since expropriation is already reflected
in the purchasing price. Sometimes, foreign investors massively buy
cheaper shares in an emerging country after the country experiences
financial crisis, which more deeply reinforces the discount. In addition,

227. In other words, when a controlling shareholder changes his status from a stationary
controller to a roving controller, it is possible that minority shareholders who purchase their
shares under a stationary controller and sell their shares under a roving controller are
financially damaged.
228. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that family controllers are not always stationary
although they are likely to be stationary.
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unlike domestic minority shareholders, 229 foreign investors are able to
achieve the benefits of international diversification.
Most of all, foreign investors are usually large institutional investors
in developed countries. Thus, they do not face substantial regulation of
investment abroad. In addition, they are capable of taking the risks of
international investment, which would enhance diversification further.
From the perspective of U.S. institutional investors, the correlation between
the United States and foreign markets is so low that adding foreign
investments to a domestic portfolio could result in lowering the risk.
Higher returns are also expected, as many emerging markets will often
outperform the markets in the developed countries. Moreover, the amount
of their investment in bad-law countries is only a small portion of their
overall investment, so foreign investors can take the risky position of
minority shareholders in bad-law countries. Nonetheless, the amount of
investment from foreign investors is significant from the perspective of
controllers in a bad-law country due to the disparity between the sizes of
the economies. Thus, in the equity market of a poor-law country, foreign
shareholders could take an important role as “minority shareholders.”
It is unlikely that foreign minority shareholders react to bad corporate
governance as an organized group and directly punish greedy controllers.
However, foreign minorities can indirectly punish overreaching controlling
shareholders. As long as foreign shareholders purchase shares of a
corporation at a proper discounted price, foreign shareholders are able to
endure a partial extraction. However, if controlling shareholders rely on
substantially all extraction, foreign shareholders would follow the Wall
Street Rule (i.e., they will sell their shares).
Domestic minority
shareholders believe that foreign minority shareholders—sophisticated and
large global financial entities—are like a litmus paper and possess better
information about domestic stocks and are more capable of assessing
corporate value. Observing the movement of foreign shareholders,
domestic minority shareholders would follow the selling trends of foreign
shareholders.230 In this way, once a developing country has a significant
number of foreign minorities in a stock market, it is likely that controlling
shareholders in the jurisdiction will not be able to easily exacerbate the
extent of tunneling.231
229. As explained earlier, domestic minority shareholders in a bad-law country have
found it difficult to participate in international investment: the circumstances in a bad-law
country, including regulations, the relatively low level of wealth, and the underdevelopment
of financial intermediaries like funds, impede international investment. See supra Part III.B.
230. In other words, domestic minority shareholders in a developing country are under
the herding effect created by foreign investors.
231. However, this does not mean that a controlling shareholder in the jurisdiction must
improve corporate governance. As long as the quality of corporate governance is
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F. Minority Shareholders May Free-Ride When a Controlling
Shareholder Expropriates Other Stakeholders
In regard to dispersed shareholder regimes, the academic interest in
corporate governance focuses on the relationship between managers and
shareholders—the former exploits the latter. On the other hand, when it
comes to controlling shareholder regimes, the lopsided relationship
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders has been
emphasized. Again, the former loots the latter. Combining these two
views, conventional corporate governance scholarship, by and large, limits
its analytical frameworks to what I call the “triumvirate model” (i.e., the
corporate governance model based on managers, controlling shareholders,
and minority shareholders). Under this tradition, minority shareholders are
(almost) always seen as the weakest in the “food chain,” extracted either by
managers or controlling shareholders. Accordingly, other stakeholders—
employees, creditors, trading partners, consumers, and taxpayers—are not
treated in this model. Perhaps, in the United States, the triumvirate
framework is working relatively well. Fiduciary duty is almost exclusively
for shareholders since other stakeholders are seen as protected by contracts.
In contrast, the traditional triumvirate framework is not necessarily
suitable for a bad-law country where economic interest of other
stakeholders (let alone that of minority shareholders) is damaged by
corporate insiders. Although controlling shareholders’ tunneling scathes a
capital market, the capital market is not the only market that is imperfect.
For example, in an imperfect labor market, employees are expropriated by
a corporation as they receive less economic benefits in exchange for their
labor. As a result, some of the employees’ welfare is transferred to the
corporation, and the entire body of all shareholders including minority
shareholders is benefitted as well.
In addition, in a country where minority shareholders are not protected
well, it is likely that creditors are not protected by contracts either. As a
borrower, a corporation is able to take advantage of creditors by various
means. For example, it is widely known that a corporation may take on a
highly risky project for shareholders at the lender’s risk. If a project is
successful, shareholders get the upside benefits as residual claimants; if it
turns out dismal, the lender should bear the downside cost. In that way,
shareholders including minority shareholders can transfer welfare from
creditors to themselves. In a bank-finance economy, the magnitude of the
maintained (and does not deteriorate further), foreign minority shareholders do not lose.
Instead, they buy and sell stocks at the same discounted rate reflecting the same quality of
corporate governance. Under these circumstances, foreign minority shareholders do not
have a strong incentive to punish controllers by following the Wall Street Rule.
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wealth transfer might be huge if creditors are not properly protected.
Furthermore, a large corporation in a bad-law country is usually able
to wield gigantic monopoly power in each market where it plays. It is
highly likely that the competition law system is inefficient, when the
quality of corporate law is low. 232 Therefore, a great deal of trading
partners’ and consumers’ welfare would be transferred to a large
corporation where minority shareholders participate as its partial owners.
Besides, the government in a developing country sometimes greatly
subsidizes large corporations.
Accordingly, taxpayers’ money is
transferred to all shareholders, including minorities.
In sum, my point is straightforward. True, in a country with poor
shareholder protection, minority shareholders are generally “victims” in
relation to the controlling shareholder who is usually suspected of being the
“wrongdoer.” The problem may arise when a controlling shareholder loots
other stakeholders in a corporation. In this case, minority shareholders may
free-ride on a controller as “shareholders” and may benefit to the detriment
of other stakeholders. In this sense, minority shareholders have incentives
to participate in stock markets where they are not properly protected vis-àvis controlling shareholders. Simply put, minority shareholders in bad-law
countries, in fact, are not situated at the bottom of the “food chain.”
Indeed, it is not conclusive whether the minority shareholders’ benefit from
this free-riding exceeds their cost of expropriation by a controller. It
depends on jurisdictions and on a case-by-case analysis. Rather, what is
emphasized here is that minority shareholders in a bad-law country are not
“unilateral victims” that is depicted by the conventional triumvirate model.
CONCLUSION
Law and finance theories proposed by LLSV have greatly contributed
by introducing scientific methodologies to comparatively evaluate
corporate governance.
Nonetheless, their works have generated
conundrums (including Gilson’s riddle and the flipside of Gilson’s riddle)
that, so far, have not been explained well. In response to these
conundrums, Professor Gilson proposes the PMBA as a possible answer.
To be sure, the PMBA is an insightful idea that changes an analytical
framework to solve Gilson’s riddle. Despite its huge contribution in
pioneering this uncharted territory, however, the PMBA’s explanatory
power could be weakened under certain circumstances, particularly in a
corporation where a controller’s cash flow rights are minimal.

232. See supra note 99 (stating the high correlation between the quality of corporate law
and competition law).
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After a critical review of the PMBA, this Article proposes alternative
explanations. To this end, this Article has two approaches. From the
perspective of a controlling shareholder, I analyze in Part II why a
controlling shareholder relies on equity finance and has so many public
investors even though the cost of equity is substantially high. In addition,
from the perspective of public investors, I analyze in Part III the incentives
of public investors to participate in capital markets with poor investor
protection. Based on these interactions in a capital market, as Marshall’s
scissors indicate, both controlling shareholders and public investors can
enjoy surplus. In this sense, informal (non-legal) institutions create a
symbiotic relationship between two parties in a bad-law country.
Since each controlling shareholder regime has its idiosyncrasies,
generating a (or the) “general theory” for the controlling shareholder
system is impractical. Perhaps, a large but missing part of the comparative
corporate governance scholarship is an analysis based on the culture, which
makes one system distinctive from the others. For example, the value of
non-pecuniary benefits is very dependent on the people’s mindset and
preferences shaped by their particular culture. In this context, it is worth
noting Professor Milhaupt’s comment. “It is obvious that an analytical
framework exploring incentives is fundamental in understanding the
conduct of rational economic persons like a controller and minority
shareholders. Nonetheless, I start to be convinced that we need to see
through the lens of culture for a more comprehensive analysis of corporate
governance.”233 Agreeing with this insight, I look forward to seeing future
works that will combine economic analysis and cultural explanations for
this largely uncharted territory of comparative corporate governance.

233. Discussion with Curtis Milhaupt, Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y.

